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The National Disaster Medical System’s Reliance on Civilian-
Based Medical Response Teams in a Pandemic is Unsound 




The world is threatened with a pandemic. Such an event, considered by many to be the 
greatest public health risk the world faces, has the potential to kill up to forty or fifty 
million people, sicken hundreds of millions, and significantly impact the global 
economy. Countries and health organizations throughout the world are monitoring the 
threat and developing strategic plans and systems to prepare for what many consider an 
inevitable and possibly imminent event.  
The United States has made it a national priority to develop strategic plans to 
coordinate preparedness and response efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. A 
relatively small but critical aspect of these plans calls for the utilization of the National 
Disaster Medical System’s (NDMS) civilian-based medical teams, to assist state and 
local governments in the event of a pandemic. Generally, past deployments of these 
federal assets have had positive results; however, the reliance on these civilian-based 
medical teams for response in a pandemic is problematic. The medical professionals 
who primarily comprise the team may be more reluctant to participate in a pandemic 
due to the increased health risks to themselves and their families. Moreover, the 
hospitals and medical systems that employ these civilian responders may be unwilling 
or unable to allow their participation in the federal response system. The federal 
government should reconsider its reliance on this civilian-based resource in the event of 
a pandemic, and focus instead on enhancing existing state and local public health and 
medical capabilities and resources.  
 
Background  
A pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus manifests itself, and is spread easily 
from human to human through coughing and sneezing. Because there is no immunity to 
this virus, the severity of the illness is significantly increased. While influenza 
pandemics are rare, occurring three times in the previous century (in 1918, 1957, and 
1968), they have the potential to cause more death and illness than any other public 
health threat. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a 1918-scale 
pandemic would sicken approximately ninety million people and kill two million more 
in the U.S. alone.1 “Almost ten million people could be hospitalized during the course of 
the pandemic, which may take more than a year to evolve.”2  Modeling based on the 
more conservative 1957 pandemic projects more than 200,000 deaths and over 
800,000 hospitalizations within the United States.3 
A pandemic is certain to occur, but when and how it will manifest is unknown. 
Currently, within the scientific and public health communities, there is particular 
concern with the virus H5N1. Commonly referred to as “avian” or “bird flu,” H5N1 is a 
strain of influenza that has primarily infected wild and domestic birds in Asia and parts 
of Europe. As the birds migrate, the virus spreads to bird populations in other countries. 
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“Most cases of avian influenza infection in humans have resulted from direct or close 
contact with infected poultry or surfaces contaminated with secretions and excretions 
from infected birds.”4 According to the World Health Organization, as of May 7, 2007 
there have been 291 confirmed cases with 172 deaths.5 “Of additional concern are the 
few instances where secondary transmission from person to person may have occurred. 
Given these events, we are currently in a Pandemic Alert Phase 3, defined by WHO as 
‘human infections with a new subtype but no human-to-human spread or at most rare 
instances of spread to a close contact.’”6 The rapid global spread of the H5N1 virus, the 
potential human-to-human transmission, and the potentially devastating consequences 
have created a sense of urgency within the U.S. government to assess various response 
capabilities and develop effective preparedness measures. Unfortunately, the need to 
develop those measures quickly has caused the federal government to overlook or ignore 
the reality that existing NDMS resources are inadequate to meet the demands a 
pandemic would place on them. 
  
FEDERAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 
Over the past several years the federal government has instituted several strategic plans 
in preparation for the pandemic: the National Response Plan (specifically ESF #8 and 
the Biological Incident Index) in December 2004, the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza and HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan in November 2005, and the 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy in May 2006. These plans guide our 
national pandemic preparedness and response efforts, emphasize the importance of 
state, local, and individual preparedness, require all federal agencies and departments 
(including federal health care systems) to develop the necessary pandemic plans, and 
identify Health and Human Services as the lead federal agency for medical response in a 
pandemic.     
In the event that the H5N1 virus mutates into a contagious human-to-human 
influenza this year, or a different pandemic strikes in ten years, the implementation of 
the National Response Plan (NRP) would be necessary:  
[The NRP] provides a conceptual and operational framework to integrate the 
capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, incident 
management, and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless 
national framework for domestic incident management.7  
The NRP breaks down the individual department and agency capabilities and 
responsibilities into Emergency Support Functions (ESF):  
[Health and Human Services (HHS)] has the primary responsibility for 
implementing ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services – which provides the 
mechanism for coordinated federal government assistance to supplement state, 
local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs in 
the face of a potential or actual large-scale public health and medical emergency.8  
According to the plan, HHS will confer with state and local medical officials to 
determine what type of medical or public heath assistance is required. HHS will then 
coordinate internal response assets such as U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned 
Corps., medical reserve corps, and the NDMS to provide the required assistance:  
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Assets internal to HHS are deployed directly as part of the ESF #8 response. 
Public health and medical personnel and teams provided by ESF #8 
organizations are requested by HHS and deployed by the respective organizations 
to provide appropriate public health and medical assistance.9  
NDMS is a primary support agency to HHS during a pandemic. “NDMS was established 
to create a single, integrated national medical response capability that ensures that 
resources are available in the event of a major disaster or emergency.”10  
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a section within the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), Response Division, Operations Branch, and is 
responsible for supporting Federal agencies in the management and coordination 
of the Federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared 
disasters…It is the mission of the NDMS to design, develop, and maintain a 
national capability to deliver quality medical care to the victims of, and 
responders to, a domestic disaster. NDMS provides state of the art medical care 
under any conditions at a disaster site, in transit from the impacted area, and into 
participating definitive care facilities.11  
NDMS relies on various specialized medical response teams to meet this integrated 
national medical response capability. 
The NDMS is made up of more than 9,000 health and medical personnel organized 
into approximately 107 response teams.12 The medical response teams are civilian 
based, and are comprised primarily of medical professionals from the various 
disciplines necessary to meet the specific team’s mission. The medical professionals are 
required to maintain the necessary certifications and licensures within their discipline; 
as such, each member is typically affiliated with, or employed by, a medical center, 
health department, or disaster organization. Upon activation, the team members are re-
classified as intermittent federal employees. The response teams and individual team 
members are then covered for worker’s compensation, liability, and medical 
malpractice.13  
NDMS has a number of response teams, each designed with a specific area of 
expertise. In addition to the various medical teams, there are management support 
teams, veterinary assistance teams, and mortuary teams. Although these teams have the 
potential to be activated and utilized in a pandemic, the focus of this discussion will be 
the medical response teams, as they will be the primary response assets deployed by 
NDMS to assist state and local authorities in a pandemic. The following briefly describes 
each team:     
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) is a group of professional and para-
professional medical personnel designed to provide medical care during a 
disaster or other event.  Teams are composed of physicians, nurses, paramedics, 
emergency medical technicians, pharmacists, mental health specialists, dentists, 
therapists, laboratory and environmental health specialists, logisticians and 
administrative support. Each team has a sponsoring organization, such as a 
major medical center, public health or safety agency, non-profit, public or private 
organization that signs a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the DHS. The 
DMAT sponsor organizes the team and recruits members, arranges training, and 
coordinates the dispatch of the team.14  
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The DMATs are designed to be a rapid response element, deployable in six to twelve 
hours, self sufficient for seventy-two hours, and remain on-site for up to fourteen days. 
“DMAT services remain on site for the duration of an extended response, operating on a 
rotating schedule of personnel and equipment.”15 They have a quasi-paramilitary 
structure, and although they can be utilized for various types of incidents, their training 
has traditionally focused on mass casualty and mass trauma events.16      
The primary mission of the National Medical Response Team (NMRT) is to respond 
to WMD incidents. The team has multiple capabilities, including mass decontamination, 
medical treatment and care, and WMD detection and monitoring. There are a total of 
four NMRTs within the United States, three of which are civilian-based. The non-
civilian based team is located in the Washington DC Metropolitan area, and is primarily 
comprised of professional fire fighters, paramedics, law enforcement officers, and 
hazardous materials specialists from the surrounding jurisdictions.  
The National Pharmacy Response Team (NPRT) and the National Nurse 
Response Team (NNRT), formed in 2002, are located in each of the 10 Federal 
Emergency Management Agency regions. They provide assistance during events 
requiring chemoprophylaxis, mass vaccinations, patient education, and risk 
communications. NRPTs are sponsored by a working group of the Joint 




The NDMS is not prepared for a pandemic. It does not have a strategic influenza 
response plan; there is insufficient management staffing at headquarters, and 
inadequate training and personal protective equipment at the team level; and NDMS 
operates under the misguided assumption that its teams will be 100% available for a 
response in a pandemic.   
Although the NDMS plays a central role in the nation’s response plans, it does not 
have its own strategic influenza response plan. Moreover, there is no specific 
information available on how these teams will be deployed and utilized in a pandemic. It 
is difficult to understand how an agency that has a primary medical mission in a 
pandemic does not have a strategic plan. The lack of a strategic plan does have one 
benefit: assets and resources are not bound by the operational restrictions within the 
plan. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the NMRT-Central was deployed to 
Houston to provide showering facilities for the evacuated New Orleans’ citizens. NMRT-
Central’s mass decontamination capabilities were designed for emergency WMD 
incidents but could be adapted to provide regular shower facilities. Given the uncertain 
demands and needs in emergency situations, NDMS teams must be prepared to perform 
a wide range of services if activated in a pandemic. In addition to providing medical care 
to the sick in a pandemic, they could potentially be utilized to provide mass vaccination 
or anti-viral medication, assist with hospital surge capacity, transportation of patients, 
triaging patients, and assisting with isolation and quarantine issues.  
NDMS’s management staffing was drastically reduced from 144 to fifty-seven in the 
transition to DHS.18 Although improvements have occurred since the transition back to 
HHS, this reduction in staffing has compromised leadership’s ability to adequately 
manage its resources and advance preparedness efforts throughout the NDMS.  
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NDMS’s broad mission is carried down to the team level. Although the various teams 
have specific missions, they are, first and foremost, medical assets and as such may be 
utilized for a variety of medical scenarios. This unspecified response mission makes it 
difficult for teams to adequately train and provide the necessary personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Appropriate training and PPE have been determined to be critical 
factors in studies conducted on the medical and public health workers’ willingness to 
work in catastrophic events. “In evaluating the willingness of Israeli health care workers 
to report to work after an unconventional missile attack, they found that although 42% 
of the respondents were willing to report to work, the percentage would increase to 86% 
if personal safety measures were provided.”19 Another study determined that  
preparedness training and education was the single most important construct.20 It is 
impossible for NDMS to provide adequate training and PPE, if does not know which and 
how their teams will be utilized. 
These NDMS teams have provided, and will continue to provide, important medical 
assistance in certain emergencies or events. However, the federal government’s blanket 
reliance and promotion of these assets to the state and local governments as a resource 
in a pandemic could have tragic consequences. Indeed, there may not be sufficient 
medical personnel available to formulate and deploy these NDMS teams to the extent 
that they are being promoted. There are three primary reasons for this:  1) The fear and 
increased health risks associated with the pandemic may reduce the availability of team 
members; 2) The medical establishments, in which the team members are associated or 
employed, may not allow their participation in the NDMS system during a pandemic; 
and 3) Health care workers will likely be unavailable for extended periods of time. 
The fear and increased health risks associated with the pandemic will reduce the 
availability of NDMS team members during a pandemic. Although there are no studies 
conducted specifically on the NDMS system with regard to medical professional 
participation in a pandemic, several studies have focused on the general health care 
worker and the public health community. Analyzing this information is important, not 
only because these occupational areas will play a major role in a pandemic, but health 
care and public health workers make up a large portion of the NDMS teams. One could 
infer that the results of surveying NDMS team members would be consistent with the 
findings in these reports.  
According to one report, Health Care Workers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to 
Duty During Catastrophic Disasters, “the most frequently cited reasons for employees’ 
unwillingness to report to duty during a disaster was fear and concern for the safety of 
their families and themselves.”21 This fear would be exacerbated for the NDMS team 
member because of the potential extended deployment and the increased and intense 
patient contact involved in a pandemic response. Furthermore, the study showed that 
the willingness of health care workers to report to work during a catastrophic event were 
lowest for events “in which the employees are more likely to perceive the highest degree 
of risk to themselves or their family (smallpox, chemical, radiation, and SARS).”22  
In any catastrophic event, medical professionals must balance fear with their 
professional obligations and responsibilities. In 2004, I experienced this firsthand when 
I was deployed to Punta Gorda, Florida to assist with the Hurricane Charlie relief 
efforts. I was assigned to assist managing the local ESF #8 and was surprised to find 
upon my arrival that a large number of local medical and public health care workers had 
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evacuated the area. Moreover, that same year during Hurricane Francis, twenty-five 
nurses were fired or suspended for leaving early or not reporting to work.23   
The local public health community, if sufficiently staffed, will most likely be the 
backbone during a pandemic response. The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan identifies the 
roles and responsibilities of the state and local public health agencies during a pandemic 
to include providing regular updates to public health providers, offering guidance on 
infection control, and investigating pandemic cases and particular situations.24 These 
actions would require an immediate response by a significant number of local public 
health workers. A recent study suggests that these numbers will not be available in a 
pandemic, as nearly half of the local health department workers are likely not to report 
for duty.25 
A more significant problem requiring immediate federal attention is the insufficient 
staffing levels in the majority of public health departments. “The public health 
infrastructure has been cut to a point where most health agencies are barely staffed to 
operate during a normal workweek.”26 The federal government cannot expect state and 
local public health officials to effectively plan and prepare for a pandemic when current 
staffing levels are inadequate.   
To make matters worse, the hospitals, public health departments, or medical systems 
with which the medical professionals are affiliated may not allow their participation 
within NDMS system in the event of a pandemic. The primary reasons for that refusal 
would be the anticipated exponential increase in patients and the reduced health care 
workforce in their own communities. The impact on the hospital system will be 
enormous, particularly because most hospitals already operate at maximum capacity. 
The pandemic is expected to quickly fill the capacity and capabilities of most hospitals; 
in fact “most Americans would be unable to access the health care sector because 
demand will exceed supply by large factors that cannot be bridged by incremental, 
marginal increases in health care capacity.”27 By allowing participation in NDMS, 
hospitals and managed care organizations would essentially be releasing their most 
valuable assets, thus reducing the hospitals’ ability to treat and care for patients. 
The medical system must also anticipate that many of their health care workers will 
likely be unavailable for extended periods of time during the pandemic. Health care 
workers will be more susceptible to contracting the flu due to their contact with infected 
patients. This will have tremendous consequences on the overall medical system, as it 
will further reduce already deficient staffing levels and the capacity to treat flu and non-
flu patients. Additionally, various personal issues will undoubtedly deplete the health 
care workforce as medical professionals remain home to care for sick family members, 
or refuse to come to work altogether for fear of becoming infected and thus potentially 
infecting family members. “During a catastrophic event, employers must recognize that 
their health care workers are likely to be as (or even more) concerned than the average 
citizen, because they might have a greater understanding of the associated risks.”28  
Every hospital operates on a budget, and the vast majority does not have a sufficient 
capital surplus to provide adequate training and supplies necessary for a pandemic. 
“One third of U.S. hospitals do not meet operating costs; among non-profit hospitals 
which are in the black, operating margins average 3%.”29 In a pandemic, the financial 
pressures will drastically increase as the “money making” services within the hospitals 
are reduced or shut down to care for flu victims. Allowing their employees to participate 
in the NDMS will further exacerbate this issue.  
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The compilation of these factors should be sufficient evidence that civil-based 
medical teams will not be the panacea the federal government portrays them as. 
  
SOLUTIONS 
The World Health Organization estimates that a significant percentage of the world 
population will require some form of medical care in the event of a pandemic. 
Regardless of the pandemic’s severity, additional professional medical assistance will be 
needed at the state or local level. The federal government must decide if this is a 
resource it wants to continue to provide, and then determine the best way to provide it 
in an effective and reliable manner.  
The reliance on civilian-based medical response teams in its current form is 
unworkable. The continued federal promotion of these civilian-based medical response 
teams to the state and local governments must stop. Federal strategic pandemic 
response plans must be modified to recognize that these teams will, most likely, not be 
available to state and local governments in a pandemic. There are indications that top-
level officials within the government are aware of this limitation. In a recent telephone 
interview with a top-level NDMS official, I was informed that other top-level 
government officials in other agencies and departments were told that the NDMS teams 
will probably not be available in a pandemic or, at most, a group of teams would be 
combined to form one team. According to the interviewee, this did not sit well with 
government officials. This fact notwithstanding, the teams remain an identified asset 
within various federal pandemic plans.   
The NDMS and U.S. public health officials must recognize and aggressively inform 
other federal agencies that these civilian-based medical response teams will not be 
available in a pandemic. The return to HHS is a more logical fit for the NDMS, and 
should provide a more effective venue to advocate the deficiencies in this asset, as HHS 
is responsible for the overall preparedness and response planning. 
The NDMS needs to develop a strategic pandemic response plan, regardless. The 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza requires that all 
federal agencies adopt and practice such a plan. As a primary supporting agency to HHS 
in a pandemic, it would seem only logical that this would be a priority for NDMS; 
however, one can only assume that the loss of management staffing, and the integration 
into DHS under the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has sidelined this 
initiative.  
Although it is uncertain how many state and local governments actually have these 
federal response teams in their pandemic plans, it is safe to assume that, in a pandemic, 
most state and locals would require additional medical assistance. The projected 
number of patients requiring medical attention, the anticipated reduced medical 
workforce, and the insufficient national public health infrastructure are primary 
indicators that supplemental medical assistance will be necessary. If preparedness is the 
key, and the state and local governments have incorporated these teams within their 
preparedness plans, then truly how prepared are they? 
If the federal government wants to continue to provide supplemental medical 
assistance teams that would respond to assist states and locals in a pandemic, then it 
must develop a national system of medical professionals who are dedicated full-time 
employees. The mission would center on domestic response for all medical and public 
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health matters throughout the United States, and the system would have a military or 
para-military structure. There would not be any question as to whether team members 
would participate in a pandemic; this would be an anticipated response, a professional 
responsibility and requirement similar to the commitments made by our military  
personnel. There would not be the issue of medical professionals receiving permission 
from their sponsoring medical facilities and hospitals, as the federal government would 
be the employer. Additionally, the team could be deployed for the extended periods of 
time projected in a pandemic.  This system could be utilized for a variety of medical and 
public health responses throughout the United States: WMD incidents, epidemics, 
vaccination programs, large scale emergencies, and natural disasters. When not 
deployed, the system could focus on medical and public health preparedness efforts, 
operating as the primary conduit between state, local, and federal agencies. This system 
could be developed from scratch, or the U.S. Public Health system could be augmented 
to provide this capability. 
    
CONCLUSION 
There are few certainties in a pandemic; we do not know when the next pandemic will 
occur; we do not know the severity, or how long it will last. What we do know, however, 
is preparedness is the key. But effective preparedness requires a continuous evaluation 
that is critical and objective. An objective and critical evaluation of the use of the NDMS 
civilian-based response teams in a pandemic would discover an impractical and 
unreliable system. Already there is sufficient evidence that this system will not work 
and, as such, the continued federal promotion of this system borders on criminal 
negligence. The short term solution is simple: instruct state and local governments that 
these assets will not be available in a pandemic. This awareness will allow state and local 
governments to critically and objectively prepare for a pandemic. The continued federal 
reliance on the NDMS to support state and locals in a pandemic is unsound. The federal 
government should instead focus its preparedness efforts on enhancing the public 
health infrastructure, expanding company incentives for vaccine development, and 
developing and stockpiling vaccines and anti-viral medications. These preparedness 
efforts will have the greatest utility in a pandemic until a sufficiently staffed, funded, 
and trained federal workforce and system is established.   
 
 
John B. Delaney, Jr., Captain, Arlington County Fire Department, Arlington Virginia, 
manages the National Medical Response Team – National Capital Region (NMRT-NCR). He is 
also assigned to the Technical Rescue Team and holds certification as a Hazardous Material 
Specialist. He holds a bachelor’s degree from James Madison University and is currently 
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A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? 
A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and 
Their Implications for Homeland Security 
James Burch 
SUMMARY 
“The safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United States. . . . As long as 
terrorists don’t do something that trips them up against our laws, they can do pretty much all they 
want.” 
        Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor1 
 
Several paradigms were altered on 9/11. The U.S. intelligence community, largely focused 
on state actors, now faced the threat posed by elusive terrorists. The community also had to 
address the asymmetry posed by the terrorists’ use of unconventional and relatively 
unsophisticated methods to create loss of life and damage – a more complex intelligence 
task. Lastly, due to terrorist disregard for national borders, laws, and transnational 
financing, the United States had to change its concept of foreign versus domestic 
intelligence.2 
The area of domestic intelligence raises several issues. First, law enforcement and 
intelligence operate in different worlds – one seeks to prosecute, the other to gather 
information.3 Second, with the development of multiple state fusion centers and the 
creation of additional organizations focused on intelligence, there is a corresponding 
increase in bureaucratization. This adds to the challenge of sharing information. Lastly and 
perhaps most importantly, there are issues concerning the protection of civil liberties and 
effective oversight. 
The challenge in developing a viable domestic intelligence capability for the United 
States centers on how to organize these capabilities optimally within the larger U.S. 
intelligence framework, how to ensure streamlined information sharing between foreign 
intelligence and the multitude of law enforcement agencies, and how best to implement 
oversight mechanisms to protect civil liberties and ensure accountability of intelligence 
operations. Organizational mechanisms, information sharing, and oversight are the three 
critical components to instituting an effective domestic intelligence capability. 
One of the proposed constructs to meet these organizational and information sharing 
challenges is to create a domestic intelligence agency. The United States is unique among 
Western or highly industrialized countries in that it does not possess one. This paper 
examines the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of instituting a domestic intelligence 
agency in the United States from the viewpoint of organization, information sharing, and 
oversight. It will assess the domestic intelligence organizations of three countries that 
possess liberal democratic institutions – the United Kingdom’s Military Intelligence 5 
(MI5), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and India’s Intelligence 
Bureau (IB) – to determine their relative effectiveness in countering terrorism, identify 
their strengths and shortfalls, and determine applicable policy recommendations for the 
United States. 
Specific criteria are used to establish a measure of assessment for a domestic intelligence 
agency. In this case, the criteria are derived from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
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Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which partners with countries to promote governance 
and determine recommendations that promote government reform. Examples of some 
criteria are the subordination of intelligence to national laws, effective coordination, and 
oversight. 
Examining countries with similar democratic institutions, threats, and (in the case of 
Australia and India) geographic scope will result in identifying key factors for instituting an 
effective domestic intelligence capability for the United States. This examination will also 
determine whether current intelligence reform policies are targeting perceived intelligence 
shortfalls and offer additional recommendations. It will also determine whether the 
establishment of a domestic intelligence agency is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to 
meeting the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century. 
INTRODUCTION 
Al Qaeda conducted a devastating strike on 9/11 by using airliners as weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD). In terms of scale, they incurred a relatively small cost to create billions 
of dollars worth of damage.4 The psychological impact was also devastating and prompted a 
massive response and reorganization of the U.S. government to combat this threat.5 Part of 
this reorganization was a close examination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). A Congressional inquiry into 9/11 revealed several FBI shortcomings: 
• “The FBI’s decentralized structure and inadequate information technology made the 
Bureau unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components. The FBI did 
not gather intelligence from all its many cases nation-wide to produce an overall 
assessment of al Qaeda’s presence in the United States.” 
• “Many FBI field offices had not made counterterrorism a top priority and they knew 
little about al Qaeda before September 11.” 
• The FBI also did not inform policymakers of the extent of terrorist activity in the 
United States. “Although the FBI conducted many investigations, these pieces were 
not fitted into a larger picture.”6 
These findings highlighted a domestic intelligence gap and, as a result, have led to 
several larger governmental initiatives and internal FBI reforms. Another 
organizational alternative is to create a domestic intelligence agency to focus solely on 
domestic intelligence and collection. Supporters of a domestic intelligence agency have 
proposed this alternative as the best method to effectively address the domestic 
intelligence gap. In attempting to address this gap, however, there are additional 
issues. First, there are opposing viewpoints as to whether the domestic intelligence 
apparatus should remain within and tied to the FBI versus establishing it as an 
independent entity. Second, the creation of another bureaucracy raises concerns about 
the effectiveness of information sharing. Third, an increased focus on domestic 
intelligence leads to concerns about civil liberties and oversight. Examining the 
domestic intelligence structures of the United Kingdom, Australia, and India in terms 
of these three issues can assist in determining the applicability of those structures and 
offer implementation considerations for the United States. 
Advocates for a separate domestic intelligence agency point to several advantages. 
The first is a symbolic one: the creation of such an agency would emphasize the 
government’s commitment to preventing another catastrophic attack.7 As Mark 
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Lowenthal states, “several issues spill over into the domestic realm – economics, 
narcotics, crime, and terrorism – thus curtailing the activities of much of the 
intelligence community . . .”8 A domestic intelligence agency would also focus directly 
on these domestic-foreign terrorism nexus’ issues and afford greater precision to 
developing and categorizing the domestic threat. Creating an agency strictly focused on 
this mission could more directly address the domestic intelligence gap as compared to 
the higher organizational and bureaucratic changes that have been implemented since 
9/11. 
Second, there is inherent competition between law enforcement and intelligence for 
resources and focus. Harry Ransom highlighted this competitive tension when referring 
to CIA intelligence and operations: “The ill advised marriage of intelligence collection-
analysis-estimates with covert action has further complicated role theory.”9 Advocates 
for a domestic intelligence agency argue that the FBI’s intelligence function will always 
take a secondary role to its law enforcement responsibilities due to the focus on 
“making cases” and the preponderance of the FBI’s leadership coming from law 
enforcement.10 Combining two missions that operate in different worlds and possess 
different challenges under one organization contributes to operational ineffectiveness. 
Lastly, it is much easier to recruit, perform undercover work, and take advantage of 
the loyal Muslim base in the United States.11 As one FBI official noted before a 
Congressional inquiry, “foreign governments often knew more about radical Islamist 
activity in the United States than did the U.S. Government because they saw this activity as 
a threat to their own existence.”12 The development of a domestic intelligence baseline to 
categorize the terrorist threat in terms of cells, planning efforts, and underlying support 
networks would directly support investigatory efforts. For the advocates, a renewed focus 
by a domestic intelligence agency dedicated to developing these intelligence resources in 
the United States would directly support prevention efforts. 
Despite the advantages, there is also considerable opposition. Opponents counter that 
the addition of another organization adds another layer of bureaucracy, making it harder to 
overcome the already obscured relationship between law enforcement and intelligence.13 
Creating another agency, while having the merit of focusing on intelligence issues, does not 
address the larger problem of information sharing outside of its organization.14 As Eric 
Taylor states, “added bureaucracies will only cause agile terrorist groups glee as they 
outmaneuver sluggish government attempts to counter them.”15 
There is also the potential abuse of civil liberties and danger of politicization. U.S. 
intelligence agencies historically have had limited roles in internal security.16 Letting an 
organization pursue an aggressive domestic intelligence agenda could lead to the 
domestic spying abuses similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s.17 The potential for such 
abuse will also increase the scrutiny of the executive branch, which could lead to a 
backlash similar to the Church and Pike Commission recommendations.18 There is also 
the danger of politicization. As Ransom asserts, “. . . politicization is inherent in the 
production of intelligence because information is crucial to gaining and preserving political 
power.”19 A domestic intelligence agency has the unique potential of becoming politicized. 
As Ransom further states, the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947 to 1967 
because, “a foreign policy consensus prevailed, secrecy normally expected by an intelligence 
agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence 
operations was very limited.”20 Those sets of circumstances do not exist today. 
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The arguments for developing a domestic intelligence agency center on its prevention 
activities, the organization’s unity of purpose, and the recruitment of intelligence sources. 
The reasons for not implementing are the additional layers of bureaucracy that do not 
facilitate information sharing, the potential abuse of civil rights, and the danger of 
politicization. The challenge and key task is to determine how to organize domestic 
intelligence efforts, how to facilitate information sharing, and how to protect against 
potential abuses in the U.S. 
Democracies, by their nature, are faced with a conflicting dilemma regarding 
terrorism. As Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Prime Minister of Israel, states: 
The governments of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of 
terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: If they do not fight 
terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if 
they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which they are charged to 
protect.21 
This dilemma lies at the center of the public debate. Richard A. Posner, a noted jurist, 
identifies two issues. The first is where to draw the line between security and liberty; 
the second is which controls are necessary to prevent any law enforcement or 
intelligence agency from crossing the line leading to potential civil rights abuses.22 As 
Posner further notes, public safety and personal liberty are both constitutional values. 
The challenge is to devise a system that balances law enforcement and intelligence 
equities, allows for information sharing, and ensures effective oversight and 
accountability of intelligence activities. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) offers some benchmarks: 
• Domestic intelligence and collection are subject to national laws. 
• The separation of foreign versus domestic intelligence requires an effective 
coordination of collection. 
• Coordination is performed by an executive branch entity. 
• Joint assessments are ideally undertaken by an independent body. 
• Executive, legislative, and judicial branches exercise oversight.23 
Examining the United Kingdom’s Military Intelligence 5 (MI5), the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) in terms of 
these benchmarks can offer ideas and insight into implementation challenges for 
improving homeland security intelligence in the United States. Each of the countries is 
similar in that they possess democratic institutions. Australia and India are more 
similar to the United States in that both possess a federalist type structure with the 
sharing of power between the federal government and state or provincial institutions. 
This distinction is considerably less in the United Kingdom. Additionally, India – the 
world’s largest democracy – can be compared more readily with the United States in 
terms of the scope of domestic intelligence challenges. Other specific intelligence 
similarities and challenges include: 
• The refocus of the British, Australian, and Indian intelligence on transnational 
terrorism and internal security issues since 9/11. 
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• The reorganization of the British, Australian, and Indian intelligence 
communities through creation of special task forces and assessment bodies 
focused on terrorism. 
• The passage of strong anti-terror legislation and the subsequent debate over 
internal security and civil liberties. 
There are, however, significant differences. The United Kingdom, Australia, and India 
possess parliamentary systems where the power of the executive is divided between the 
head of state and head of government. The head of government, in this case the Prime 
Minister, is also reliant on the support of the legislative branch or parliament. This 
support is expressed through a vote of confidence or no confidence. The distinction and 
separation between the executive and legislative branches of government is much 
clearer in the United States. Other differences also include the wide differences in 
language and culture within India versus the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia. The ethnic differences in India have resulted in significant and recurring 
sectarian violence since its independence in 1947. The United Kingdom has also faced a 
similar issue with regard to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Simply put, a 
relationship exists between countries with significant internal stability problems and 
the nature of the oversight mechanisms they possess. Specific differences include: 
• The United Kingdom is much smaller geographically than the United States. 
Additionally, the United Kingdom and Australia are island nations with lesser 
border control and security issues as compared to the scale and scope of the 
United States or India. 
• Indian geography – its scale and proximity to terrorist safe havens in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and the Kashmir – coupled with its much larger 
population and significant Muslim minority leads to greater internal security 
issues beyond the scale of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. 
Considering the similarities and differences, there is value in assessing the 
effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s MI5, Australia’s ASIO, and India’s IB. The 
applicability of their practices will be assessed by using the DCAF’s benchmarks and 
utilizing the following criteria: 
• Feasible: Task can be accomplished with forces and resources. 
• Suitable: Will mission be accomplished if tasks are carried out successfully? 
• Acceptable: Results are politically supportable.24 
 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S SECURITY SERVICE BRANCH – MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE 5 (MI5) 
 
“We're always trying to improve our intelligence gathering but these groups operate in an 
immensely secretive way, it is very, very difficult often to track down exactly what they're 
doing . . .”25 
- Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
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Organization. The MI5, also known as the Security Service, is the United Kingdom’s 
domestic intelligence agency. It is responsible for responding to a wide range of 
security threats that include terrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass 
destruction, and organized crimes. MI5 falls under the Home Ministry, which has no 
precise U.S. equivalent.26 The Security Service is one of three tier-one intelligence 
organizations. The Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6, focuses on foreign intelligence 
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is responsible for 
communications intercept and code breaking efforts.27 
MI5 is chartered to conduct domestic surveillance operations against a wide variety 
of targets, but it does not possess independent arrest powers.28 The philosophy behind 
this organizational relationship is to force MI5 to work hand-in-hand the various fifty-
six police forces in the United Kingdom, particularly the Metropolitan and provincial 
Special Branches (SB).29 As Peter Chalk states, “The Special Branch structure is the 
primary instrument through which intelligence is translated into operational activity 
and prosecutions.”30 
Despite the terrorist attacks in London (2005), the MI5 can point to credible 
successes. The former Director of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller has stated that 
MI5 is tracking approximately 200 radical groups and over 1,600 individuals who are 
actively supporting or linked to terrorist activities focused on the United Kingdom – 
whether domestically or in foreign areas.31 Given MI5’s size, the scope of these numbers 
would suggest a high degree of coordination, precision, and fidelity between Britain’s 
foreign intelligence community, its assessment bodies, and law enforcement entities.32 
Strategic Outlook. The United Kingdom has a history of combating terrorists, 
particularly in its long struggle against the IRA. As a result, MI5 has an established 
tradition of conducting domestic intelligence operations to include electronic 
surveillance, recruitment, and infiltration of terrorist groups. It also has a well 
established working relationship with law enforcement. 
The events of 9/11 fundamentally shifted the focus of the United Kingdom’s 
intelligence apparatus. Islamic terrorism is now identified as the number one threat.33 
MI5’s intelligence functions are part of a greater government counter-terrorism 
strategy known as CONTEST. The overarching aim of this strategy is to reduce the risk 
of terrorism through pursuit of four strategic approaches or lines of operation: prevent, 
pursue, protect, and prepare.34 Intelligence gathering and disrupting terrorist activities 
are identified as two integral components under pursuit activities. MI5 performs a 
unique service to support these two lines of operation.35 
Information Sharing. MI5 serves as an assessment agency as well as a collection 
entity. Its analysis directly supports the United Kingdom’s Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), which serves as the government’s focal point for intelligence 
prioritization and assessment.36 The JIC also provides regular assessments to ministers 
and other senior officials.37 The establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) in June 2003 (under the supervision of MI5) brings analysts from the 
respective intelligence agencies under one umbrella to facilitate the sharing of 
intelligence and breaking down of cross-agency barriers.38 Underneath the JTAC 
structure, the various Special Branches have pooled their resources to develop Regional 
Intelligence Cells that share responsibilities and support further information sharing.39 
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Although the United Kingdom has a highly evolved intelligence structure with a long 
tradition of conducting domestic intelligence, there have been several instances of 
information-sharing shortfalls. MI5 has been criticized for not providing warning of the 
Bali attacks in October 2002, the Mombasa attack in November 2002, and failing to 
pass specific intelligence regarding the shoe bomber, Richard Reid.40 
The development of a strategic intelligence architecture and information sharing 
policies is a relevant issue for the United States. Information sharing remains a 
problematic issue despite the United Kingdom’s well established intelligence 
mechanisms, clearly defined missions and roles, and assessment organs. An 
examination of the U.S. intelligence architecture and information sharing practices – a 
key 9/11 shortfall – is critical and uniquely relevant particularly given the numerous 
changes, reorganizations, and reforms within the U.S. intelligence community. An 
assessment of these changes is necessary particularly as the events of 9/11 move further 
into the past. 
Oversight. The authority of Britain’s Cabinet structure from a majority in the House 
of Commons affords the Prime Minister greater latitude on national security and 
intelligence matters.41 Although the Security Service Act of 1989 codified MI5’s rules, 
missions, and functions, the intelligence and security services were largely exempt from 
the scrutiny of Parliament and the public until the passing of the Intelligence Services 
Act of 1994.42 As a result of this legislation, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) now reviews the budget, administration, and policy of all three 
intelligence agencies.43 Its legislative oversight function, however, is much more 
limited that the U.S. congressional committee system.44 
Executive oversight is also exercised by the ISC, which consists of nine members of 
parliament from various political parties. The ISC reports directly to the Prime 
Minister and is charged with producing an annual report on intelligence activities.45 
This committee operates within Britain’s “ring of secrecy,” which is bounded by the 
Official Secrets Act.46 The Official Secrets Act allows the British government to 
exercise, in effect, prior restraint with respect to any disclosure of information that can 
be deemed harmful to the national interest.47 Although the ISC is chartered with 
exercising oversight, its members are appointed by and answer directly to the Prime 
Minister – creating the potential for a conflict of interest. Additionally, despite the 
oversight mechanisms, MI5 continues to remain essentially a self-tasking organization 
requiring no separate approval before initiating a new operation.48 There have also 
been instances of politicization, particularly during the 1980s when MI5 conducted 
counter-subversive operations against leftwing politicians and organizations who Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher termed, “the Enemy Within.”49 
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Figure 1. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K. 
 
Conclusion. MI5’s strengths lie in its ability to operate under a well defined executive 
structure that utilizes an independent intelligence assessment umbrella and operates 
under a well understood set of laws. The organization also has a long history of 
performing its internal security and domestic intelligence functions. The United 
Kingdom also possesses several highly evolved mechanisms to coordinate the sharing 
of intelligence. Despite this structure, there have been several instances where MI5 did 
not share its intelligence. Effective intelligence sharing remains an issue. Although 
there are existing oversight mechanisms, the structure of the United Kingdom’s 
oversight organs also inhibits significant legislative oversight of the intelligence 
process. Utilizing the DCAF benchmarks listed in Figure 1, the United Kingdom’s 
strengths lie in its strong executive coordination and independent assessment process. 
Its domestic intelligence agency also operates under a well defined set of national laws, 
although the effectiveness of information sharing remains an issue. Lastly, given the 
United Kingdom’s oversight structure and MI5’s past abuses, the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms that balance civil liberties versus public safety remain a 
potential area of concern. An assessment of information-sharing practices and 
oversight procedures – given the numerous changes within the U.S. intelligence 
community and the recent FBI controversy on the handling and accountability of 
National Security Letters – is of particular relevance for the United States. 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION (ASIO) 
 
“In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing 
more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence.”50 
John Howard, Australian Prime Minister 
Organization: The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) serves as 
Australia’s domestic intelligence organization. Similar to MI5, it is chartered to address 
a wide variety of threats.51 ASIO works closely with the Australian Protective Service 
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(APS), with both agencies falling under Australia’s Attorney General.52 ASIO is also one 
of three tier-one intelligence organizations. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
(ASIS) functions as the foreign intelligence entity while the Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD) is focused on signals intelligence.53 
Heavily influenced by the British philosophy of separating domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement powers, ASIO does not have independent arrest powers.54 As such, 
ASIO must work closely with police entities particularly the APS – roughly equivalent 
to the FBI or the Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP). The primary venue for APS-
ASIO interaction is through the National Threat Assessment Centre, which serves as 
the focal point for collaboration with federal organization and state police forces.55 
Strategic Outlook. Australia does not have a long history of combating terrorists. It 
has not been plagued by an internal threat (like the United Kingdom and the IRA) or 
India’s numerous internal security issues due to its linguistic and ethnic differences. 
Additionally, Australia has been largely isolated by the nature of its geography. As a 
whole, Australia has typically viewed its strategic threats in a foreign context and has 
prized the value of international cooperation with its allies to deal with its security 
issues.  
Despite its lack of internal threats, the Australian government has taken a serious 
and very thorough approach to internal security. It went through significant security 
preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, which also highlighted the value of 
international cooperation.56 The Australian government now recognizes Islamic 
terrorism as its highest threat priority and has committed significant resources to 
counterterrorism as a result of the 9/11 attacks and al Qaeda statements that identify 
Australia as a target.57 ASIO’s intelligence function operates as part of the government’s 
four pronged counterterrorism approach: prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Improving intelligence capacity, increasing the effectiveness of information 
sharing, seeking better detection capabilities, and improving law enforcement 
coordination are the overarching themes under prevention and preparedness.58 
Despite the lack of a historical internal security threat or Australia’s priority as a 
target for a terrorist attack, the ASIO can point to some success in categorizing and 
tracking domestic terrorist threats. Similar to the MI5, ASIO also has the reputation for 
thoroughness and developing precise intelligence. On November 18, 2005, Australian 
authorities foiled the activities of two terrorist cells. ASIO and Australian law 
enforcement agencies were able to prevent an attack possibly aimed at critical 
infrastructure as a result of an eighteen-month long investigation into individuals with 
possible linkages to al Qaeda and radical Kashmiri groups.59 
Information Sharing. Like MI5, ASIO also serves as an analytic assessment agency. 
The Office of National Assessment (ONA) serves as Australia’s premier strategic 
assessment organization. ONA, ASIO, ASIS, and DSD also enjoy close access to the 
Prime Minister’s Office.60 The National Intelligence Group (NIG), which resides under 
ASIO, collates intelligence from multiple sources and disseminates products to 
governmental and law enforcement officials through Joint Intelligence Groups.61 
Executive coordination of domestic intelligence and other matters is accomplished 
through the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and the Secretaries’ 
Committee on National Security (SCoNS). The NSC consists of senior policy makers 
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while the SCoNS consists of department secretaries who, like those in the United 
Kingdom, are professional bureaucrats.62 
Although Australia’s intelligence system is modeled on the United Kingdom’s, with 
domestic intelligence having to work closely with law enforcement entities, there have 
also been corresponding shortfalls in information sharing. ASIO’s performance was 
also criticized for disregarding threat assessments from regional analysts regarding the 
Bali attack in 2002 – an area directly under ASIO’s concern.63 Like the United 
Kingdom, Australia has a highly defined intelligence community; however, its track 
record on information sharing is an issue. Despite Australian and British similarities 
and the ability of their domestic intelligence agencies to possibly develop greater 
precision in categorizing the domestic threat, their identified information sharing 
problems remain a relevant issue for the United States. 
Oversight. ASIO’s statutory responsibilities are outlined in the ASIO Act of 1979. 
Although Australia is similar to the United Kingdom, there is a greater distinction 
between executive and legislative oversight roles. The Intelligence Services Act of 2001 
expanded the role of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in 
overseeing Australia’s intelligence apparatus.64 The committee can initiate 
investigations or respond to requests from the Attorney General requests.65 Australia’s 
executive oversight is also more robust. The Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) is an independent officer appointed by the Governor-General and 
located within the Prime Minister’s office. This unique arrangement allows the IGIS to 
assist the government and parliament in oversight matters, but allows the office to act 
independently. The IGIS also enjoys total access to all intelligence and possesses the 
power of independent inquiry.66 This oversight also includes access to case files, 
warrant powers, and financial records. 
Although not a method of oversight, the Australian government also has an 
aggressive public outreach program. The federal government has established National 
Security Public Information Guidelines for all agencies engaged in national security 
issues to promote the public’s understanding of the missions and threat. A National 
Security Public Information Campaign also seeks to encourage public vigilance. 
Security information is pushed via a variety of media means to inform the Australian 
public of the government’s efforts against terrorism and to create a safer 
environment.67 These efforts directly support ASIO’s efforts in engaging communities 
to derive community-based information conduits to support its assessments. This is in 
stark contrast to MI5’s historical outlook regarding public engagement, which took the 
major step of instituting a public website only after 9/11.68 Despite these strong 
oversight mechanisms, ASIO has also been criticized for heavy-handed and intrusive 
tactics in the past against leftwing groups.69 
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Figure 2. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K.-Australia 
 
CONCLUSION. ASIO’s strength, like MI5, lies in its ability to operate under a well 
defined structure and an independent assessment umbrella. ASIO also has a long 
history in internal security and domestic intelligence. Despite possessing a highly 
evolved information sharing structure, there have also been corresponding shortfalls in 
ASIO’s information sharing performance. Lastly, Australia has robust executive and 
legislative oversight mechanisms, which although not possessing a perfect track record, 
are effective in overseeing the country’s intelligence process. An examination of 
Australian oversight mechanisms and public outreach programs may offer some areas 
for improvement in the United States. When compared against the DCAF benchmarks 
in Figure 2, Australia’s top strengths lie in its strong laws governing domestic 
intelligence, the ability of the executive body to coordinate intelligence, and its 
independent assessment capability. Similar to the United Kingdom, it also has faced 
some information sharing shortfalls and although it possesses a better defined 
executive and legislative oversight process, there have been instances of past abuse. 
 
THE INDIAN INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (IB) 
“We are fully on board as far as the global war against terror is concerned. We will cooperate 
with everybody, bilaterally, regionally, at the global level, in the fight against terror.”70 
 Manmoham Singh, Prime Minister of India 
 
Organization. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) functions as India’s internal security 
agency.71 One of the longest functioning intelligence agencies, its roots can be traced 
back to the Imperial Intelligence Bureau, which served British interests in India.72 It is 
chartered with a wide range of responsibilities spanning from combating terrorists and 
the separatist efforts of Naxalists (Indian Maoists) to critical infrastructure protection 
– particularly aviation security.73 The IB falls under India’s Ministry of Home Affairs 
although the Director of the IB can report to the Prime Minister on intelligence 
issues.74 Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia, which possess separate foreign 
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espionage and signals intelligence organizations, India’s Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW) oversees all of India’s foreign intelligence.75 Similar to MI5 and ASIO, the IB 
does not have independent arrest powers and must rely on federal and state law 
enforcement elements. 
India has been hard pressed to reform its intelligence apparatus. Following the 
eleven-week skirmish in 1999 with Pakistan, the Group of Ministers (GoM) initiated a 
major study of India’s security and intelligence. This study, headed by former RAW 
director, Girish Saxena, submitted numerous recommendations to streamline the 
intelligence process.76 The Saxena Committee performed the first major review of 
Indian national security and intelligence since its independence in 1947.77 For the IB, 
these initiatives included the development of an independent signals intelligence 
capability, an expansion of the IB’s field presence by bolstering its Subsidiary 
Intelligence Bureaus (SIB) at the state level, implementation of Inter-State Intelligence 
Support Teams, development of Joint Task Forces for Intelligence (JTFIs), and a Multi 
Agency Centre (MAC) to electronically collate and database related intelligence.78 
Despite its promise, most of the reforms have not been implemented – largely due to 
bureaucratic infighting. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have 
disapproved the key elements recommended by the committee.79 The development of 
the IB’s signals intelligence capability has been stalled. The Finance Ministry has 
disapproved the IB’s request for computer trained personnel to develop and maintain 
the MAC. Funding for the JTFIs and associated training has also been cut. This 
bureaucratic confrontation is attributable to the long standing infighting between the 
Indian Administrative Service officers who dominate the Home ministry and the Indian 
Police Service officers who constitute the majority of the IB.80 The inability the Indian 
government to institute meaningful intelligence reforms, establish clear organizational 
mission roles and responsibilities, and manage the competitive tensions between 
different bureaucracies are of critical importance given the similarities of the U.S. 
intelligence community and its efforts to reform itself, institute organizational change, 
and establish a strategic approach to combating terrorism in a post 9/11 environment. 
Strategic Outlook. India has faced many internal security problems since 
establishing its independence in 1947. Consisting of a multitude of ethnicities, 
languages, and particularly due to the partition of India and Pakistan, India has faced 
numerous acts of sectarian violence. In 1999, the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 
prompted calls for stronger anti-terrorism legislation. The subsequent events of 9/11 
affected the Indian government’s perception of the al Qaeda threat and provided an 
opportunity for parliamentarians to enact stronger legislation that addressed 
transnational terrorism and financing issues.81 In 2002, the legislature, led by the 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, passed The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – a 
strong anti-terror legislation similar to the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia.82 The legislation came under severe criticism and was later repealed in 2004 
with the entrance of a new government under the opposing Congress party.83 The July 
2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai have renewed the demands for more stringent anti-
terrorism legislation. 
Although the Indian government has recognized the threat posed by al Qaeda 
through its proximity to the Indian subcontinent, the government has been unable to 
articulate precisely its approach to combating terrorism. A key shortfall in the POTA 
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legislation was that it lacked any linkage to a wider counterterrorism strategy and 
approach. As Swati Pandey states: 
For a counterterrorism law, lawmakers should consider the state’s police capabilities, 
the legal system, and the political leanings of its population to make sure that the law 
will be successful. If these means are sufficient, then the goals of the law can be 
reached.84 
The absence of political buy-in, unclear linkages between the legislation’s intent and 
the actual capabilities of security forces, and poor existing oversight mechanisms result 
in a mismatch between the strategic vision versus actual practice. The Indian 
government’s approach has been erratic with limited consensus between political 
parties. These inconsistencies stem from India’s longer-term inadequacy in managing 
national security. As B. Raman asserts, this is due to three factors: 
The absence of long-term thinking and planning are due to preoccupation with 
day-to-day crisis management and short-term compulsions, the inhibition of 
fresh thinking and a coordinated approach to national security issues due to the 
undue influence of narrow departmental mindsets, and the absence of a 
watchdog set-up, uninfluenced by departmental loyalties, to monitor the 
implementation of the national security decisions and remove bottlenecks.85  
Given this framework and unlike MI5 and ASIO, the role of the IB is less clear. The IB 
clearly has many domestic intelligence functions. Conversely, unclear strategic 
guidance, obscured responsibilities, bureaucratic infighting, and extremely limited 
oversight mechanisms severely hamper its ability to execute its mission. The Indian 
shortfalls of translating strategic intent into coherent intelligence reform and 
community management is of paramount – indeed critical - importance for the United 
States as it attempts to redefine its intelligence apparatus in a post 9/11 environment. 
Information Sharing. The challenges faced by the IB are also a reflection of the 
Indian national security apparatus. The Saxena Committee recommended the 
implementation of an Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) and Technology 
Coordination Group (TCG) to work closely with the National Security Council 
Secretariat (NSCS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).86 These groups were 
intended to focus on resource allocation, annual reviews, national estimates, and 
executive oversight.87  
Bureaucratic infighting has also plagued the information sharing and assessment 
process. The National Security Council (NSC), revived as part of the committee’s 
recommendations, has been ineffective in orchestrating the various agencies towards a 
single purpose.88 The NSC is rarely convened and does not have a dedicated staff 
structure to support this process.89 Senior officials also state that there is little to no 
coordination between the IB, RAW, and the newly formed Defence Intelligence Agency 
(DIA).90 
Although India’s organizational structures are similar to the United Kingdom and 
Australia, they are not as developed or resourced. Bureaucratic infighting and the lack 
of strong executive direction have limited the IB’s effectiveness. There is also an 
inherent instability in India’s organizational approaches and processes to managing 
national security and intelligence functions.91 Despite its responsibility for domestic 
intelligence, the IB has not been given the requisite tools to perform varied 
responsibilities. As Praveen Swami, an Indian journalist noted for his coverage of 
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Indian national security issues commented, “The head of the U.S.’ Federal Bureau of 
Investigation can authorize the cash down purchase of millions of dollars of equipment, 
while the Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau cannot authorize the purchase of a 
new desktop computer for his secretary.”92 
Oversight. The Saxena Committee also attempted to address oversight issues by 
defining India’s different intelligence agency’s missions and roles and to ensure 
executive oversight via the NSCS.93 The inability to implement these reforms, 
particularly at the executive and assessment level, has resulted in little progress. 
Additionally, abuse of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 prohibits national security issues 
from coming into the forefront of public debate.94 As Sarath Ramkumar notes, “Top-
level political appointees quickly become vigilant in seeking to preserve three main 
bureaucratic prerogatives of secrecy: control over preservation, control over custody 
and control over access.”95 
In the absence of a wider public debate, India’s parliamentary members rarely 
discuss or understand the wider implications of India’s intelligence issues.96 In fact, the 
IB and the RAW are not formally accountable to the parliament.97 The lack of an 
effective oversight structure leads to India’s legislature being removed from the 
process. The Standing Committee on Home Affairs has received briefings on the IB’s 
activities, but few of its members have a background in intelligence or are sufficiently 
staffed to exercise effective oversight.98 Ramkumar offers the following insightful 
assessment of India’s intelligence community: 
Intelligence agencies are not islands that exist outside executive control. The 
usefulness and the quality of intelligence is only as good as the government of 
the day requires. Any serious reforms in the field of intelligence need an 
understanding of the precise role of intelligence agencies in serving the nation’s 
national security interest.99 
The lack of executive and legislative oversight mechanisms has resulted in the 
politicization of the IB. Most of the bureau’s focus has been on political surveillance 
and election-related information gathering in support of the ruling party.100 As one 
member of the National Security Advisory Board commented recently, “How can we 
expect the IB to function if a large part of its resources is directed at serving the ruling 
political party of the day?”101 
Although the United Kingdom and Australia have suffered from oversight shortfalls, 
the Indian shortcomings in this area have hampered greater intelligence reforms. 
Understanding the linkage between implementing reform and oversight, given the 
challenge faced by the Indian government, is of unique importance for the United 
States. Improving the effectiveness of intelligence oversight – an identified 9/11 
recommendation – serves to link the intent and vision of national strategy to the 
implementation of intelligence reforms.102 
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Figure 3. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K.-Australia-India 
 
Conclusion. The IB has not been given the necessary tools and resources to fulfill its 
mission. Although the IB has a long history of performing its internal security function, 
the majority of its focus has been on political surveillance. Despite sound 
recommendations and higher-level organizational initiatives, bureaucratic infighting 
and petty competition have inhibited translating these initiatives into meaningful 
activities. Lastly, despite possessing definitive intelligence organizations and mandated 
assessment entities, the lack of strong executive direction and bipartisanship, weak 
legislative oversight, organizational instability, and ineffective resourcing have resulted 
in a listless national security and intelligence apparatus. These limitations, when 
compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 3, display a marginal effectiveness. 
India’s intelligence apparatus does not operate under a well defined set of laws and 
coordination between intelligence agencies remains an endemic problem. Its 
independent assessment capability has not been properly resourced and bureaucratic 
infighting greatly inhibits the ability of the executive to coordinate and direct 
intelligence efforts. Lastly, India’s almost total lack of executive and legislative 
oversight severely limits accountability and the ability to reform the system. 
 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: APPLICATION FOR THE UNITED 
STATES? 
Proponents of a domestic intelligence agency highlight the importance of prevention, 
yet domestic intelligence agencies focused solely on information gathering and 
developing sources have not been proven to be more effective in preventing terrorist 
attacks. They may have a greater ability to develop better and more precise intelligence 
assessments on the nature of the domestic threat. The bombings in London (2005) and 
Mumbai (2006), however, highlight the point that not all attacks can be prevented. 
Additionally, the metrics for how many attacks have been prevented and where these 
agencies can cite unreported successes is absent due to their classified nature. By 
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examining the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, it is evident that the challenges of 
coordinating intelligence, sharing information, and implementing oversight 
mechanisms are problematic and relevant issues for their domestic intelligence 
agencies. 
Organization. For the United States, intelligence coordination and assessment were 
highlighted as significant shortfalls after 9/11. Although the United States does not 
have an assessment apparatus as highly centralized and evolved as the United Kingdom 
or Australia, it has been recognized as a shortfall and steps have been taken to address 
this issue. The major change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
with an intelligence charter. The U.S. government also adopted measures to implement 
intelligence coordination and improve identified shortfalls through the creation of the 
Director for National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counter Terrorism Center 
(NCTC), and revamping the FBI’s intelligence capability.103 Calls for further FBI 
reforms have continued. As a result of further findings, the FBI consolidated many of 
its intelligence functions under the creation of the National Security Service.104 Despite 
the creation of these new agencies and initiatives, the effectiveness of these 
organizations to implement and institutionalize intelligence reforms, manage 
resources, and develop strategic assessments as envisioned in the national strategy is 
questionable, particularly since these initiatives have occurred within a relatively short 
period of nearly six years after 9/11 and given similar Indian attempts over the last 
decade. 
Information Sharing. As with the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, 
information sharing is a significant issue for the United States. This is recognized as a 
core issue in the National Intelligence Strategy for the United States.105 Further 
measures have been taken to address this issue through creating the NCTC, instituting 
the DHS, reforming the FBI’s headquarters, implementing Field Intelligence Groups 
(FIGs), and developing state intelligence fusion centers. The domestic intelligence 
challenge in the United States is similar to India’s in terms of organization and the 
scope of the problem. Despite higher level initiatives, the FBI continues to have a “law 
enforcement” mindset, is experiencing similar problems with implementing its 
information sharing technology, and is faced with coordinating with multiple state and 
local efforts.106 The DHS has also been faced with similar bureaucratic hurdles. 
Additionally, there is no clear linkage or relationship between the NCTC and the 
numerous state and local fusion centers that have been created since 9/11.107 As a 
result, the level of integration remains questionable. Despite the plethora of executive 
findings and directives, there are still significant bureaucratic hurdles and infighting to 
sharing information. 
Oversight. Intelligence oversight remains an issue for the United States. 
Controversies such as the National Security Agency’s (NSA) electronic surveillance and 
the Department of Defense’s Counter Intelligence Field Activity’s (CIFA) monitoring of 
U.S. persons, the intelligence activities in Guantánamo, and the handling of National 
Security Letters remain at the forefront of the political debate. Intelligence initiatives 
have been undertaken since 9/11, but most of these efforts – particularly with regard to 
domestic intelligence – have received significant criticism due to ineffective 
implementation efforts and a lack of bipartisan buy-in. While oversight issues are also 
challenges for MI5, ASIO, and the IB, Australia seems to have a highly developed, 
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resourced, and aggressive executive and legislative oversight component. A closer 
examination of Australia’s oversight practices and mechanisms could yield practical 
lessons for the United States. Additionally, the United States needs to streamline and 
improve its legislative oversight process – a key recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission – to ensure proper safeguards for civil liberties and accountability of 





Figure 4. DCAF Benchmarks versus U.K.-Australia-India-U.S. 
 
Conclusion. When compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 4, the United States 
possesses a well defined set of laws operating under a strong executive mechanism. 
These strengths, however, are offset by a weaker executive and legislative oversight 
process. Although U.S. oversight mechanisms limit the statutory ability of the FBI and 
other agencies to conduct domestic intelligence, there are still oversight shortfalls in 
terms of staffing, resources, and legislative access. As seen in the Indian case, limited 
oversight can also lead to poor implementation of intelligence initiatives. Although 
there have been numerous fact-finding commissions, such as the 9/11, the Commission 
on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, and the numerous panels prior to 9/11, there has not been a strategic and 
bipartisan approach to overseeing and tracking the implementation and effectiveness of 
these reforms. Lastly, although steps have been taken to institutionalize the NCTC’s 
independent assessment capability and fuse domestic and foreign intelligence, it is 
uncertain whether these steps are translating into positive action, whether they are 
truly combining with the efforts of the DHS or regional, state, or large metropolitan 
fusion centers, or whether an additional layer of bureaucracy has been added to an 




BURCH, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 




Although domestic intelligence agencies possess several shortfalls in not being able to 
prevent terrorist attacks and have corresponding information-sharing shortfalls and 
oversight issues, these shortfalls do not address the entire scope of the problem. While 
domestic intelligence agencies may not be able to prevent all terrorist attacks, are they 
more successful in preventing most attacks? Do effective domestic intelligence 
agencies, solely focused on intelligence gathering and unencumbered by law 
enforcement responsibilities, possess a better ability to focus and develop precise 
intelligence? Without access to classified sources or performance measures, most 
literature would suggest that domestic intelligence agencies are more effective in 
developing intelligence through the penetration of terrorist cells and collation of other 
intelligence data.109 
Additionally, the combination of law enforcement and intelligence functions under 
the FBI and the Attorney General, acting as the federal government’s chief legal officer, 
has also led to civil rights abuses. Opponents to the creation of a domestic intelligence 
agency fail to recognize that the argument for separating domestic intelligence from 
law enforcement functions was precisely the reason for limiting the West German 
government’s ability to exercise arbitrary power when it was reconstituted as a nation 
in the 1950s.110 In other words, the German domestic intelligence apparatus was 
consciously separated from law enforcement responsibilities to prevent an abuse of 
power. Balancing civil rights and public safety remains a problematic issue for 
democracies whether they possess a domestic intelligence agency or not. 
Despite the arguments posed by the advocates for and opponents to having a 
domestic intelligence agency for the United States, an examination of MI5, ASIO, and 
the IB have shown that domestic intelligence agencies are not necessarily the solution 
to addressing the domestic intelligence gap. They may possess a greater ability to better 
categorize threats and operate unencumbered by complicated and competing mission 
roles within one agency. In terms of the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of 
implementing this organizational construct for the United States, it is feasible to 
develop a U.S. domestic intelligence agency if the resources and executive direction are 
applied to instituting this capability. The critical feasibility issue, however, is whether 
the United States can translate strategic guidance and direction into meaningful 
change, reform, and capability that mitigates the domestic intelligence gap – whether 
under a domestic intelligence agency or some other organizational construct. This is 
the clear lesson from India’s attempt to reform the IB and institute larger intelligence 
reforms. 
Suitability (whether the mission will be accomplished if the tasks are carried out 
successfully) is also contingent on the ability to translate strategic intent into 
meaningful change. The 9/11 Commission did not see a need to create a domestic 
intelligence agency unless their other recommendations were not adopted – to create 
an effective NCTC and Director of National Intelligence (DNI).111 The effectiveness of 
the DNI to implement reform was questionable when 96 percent of the FBI’s 
intelligence function fell outside of the DNI’s purview.112 Continued FBI reform 
attempts, as evidenced by reorganization efforts in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, are 
indicative of organizational instability or resistance to change.113 Organizational 
instability and resistance to change can also be applied to NSA. Additionally, the 
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obstacles to creating a unified DHS are another indication of bureaucratic 
intransigence. The implementation of a strategic vision into reality is clearly a 
challenge that India has had to face. These shortfalls and others would indicate that 
current tasks and reforms are not being effectively implemented. 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and India have been unable 
to prevent terrorist attacks. In the absence of definitively demonstrating that domestic 
intelligence agencies are better positioned to prevent most attacks, the single largest 
obstacle to implementing this organizational construct in the United States is cultural. 
Given the history and structure of the United States, it is probably still not acceptable 
to have a domestic intelligence agency. Although the political supportability was 
stronger after 9/11, most Americans do not like to feel that they are being spied upon by 
their government or neighbors.114 Additionally, as Kate Martin points out, “Nothing in 
the pre-September 11 law prevented the CIA from informing the FBI that the suspected 
terrorists had entered the United States, and nothing would have prevented the FBI 
from pursuing them.”115 The issue lies in the practical interpretation of these 
regulations. It was the inability to effectively put these regulations into practice that led 
to information-sharing shortfalls prior to 9/11. It is also the inability to effectively 
implement the post 9/11 regulations and intelligence initiatives through a bipartisan 
approach – such as the NSA monitoring program – that creates continued foreign-
domestic information sharing gaps. 
The central issue is not whether to have a combined law enforcement and 
intelligence organization versus a sole domestic intelligence agency. The issue is 
effective organizational reform, information sharing, and oversight.116 Effective 
organizational change, information sharing, and oversight are not necessarily achieved 
through high-level organizational repositioning, implementing common information 
data systems, or passing new regulations for managing intelligence operations and 
reform. The absence of a significant terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 is 
also not a good indicator that the intelligence apparatus is operating more efficiently. 
The creation of additional bureaucracies, an increased centralization of intelligence 
functions that inhibits the analysis of opposing alternatives, and the inability of the 
U.S. Congress to reform its oversight process may have actually led to greater 
drawbacks rather than progress. Although the United States has developed strategies 
and applied significant resources to address its weaker areas – such as the creation of 
the DNI to oversee the intelligence community, the NCTC to integrate domestic-foreign 
intelligence and develop assessments, and the professionalization of the DHS and the 
FBI’s intelligence functions – there remains a level of uncertainty whether these 
initiatives have resulted in greater progress and meaningful transformation. This 
uncertainty continues to place the United States at risk. To address these information 
sharing and oversight uncertainties, the following actions are recommended: 
• Assess the ability of the DNI to exercise leadership and management over the 
intelligence community in terms of controlling resources, implementing cross-
organizational information sharing initiatives, and effecting reform consistent 
with the National Intelligence Strategy for the United States. This is a clear 
lesson learned from similar Indian attempts to reform its intelligence 
community since the 1999 GoM findings. 
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• Capitalizing on the British and Australian strengths in developing strategic 
assessments and categorizing domestic threats, conduct an end-to-end 
organizational review of NCTC to analyze its performance compared to its stated 
mission, particularly its ability to support its domestic intelligence assessment 
within a national and not strictly federal context. 
• Given the identified information-sharing shortfalls with countries possessing 
domestic intelligence agencies, conduct a review of information sharing and 
knowledge management policies to assess the applicability of current policies 
versus actual practice, most notably providing warning and the sharing of raw 
and unevaluated intelligence between organizations.117 
• Review the FBI’s and DHS’s intelligence reform initiatives in terms of 
professionalization, information sharing, strategic focus, and resource 
allocation to determine if there is a continued law enforcement versus 
intelligence mindset, as evidenced by Indian bureaucratic infighting. 
• Drawing from Australian strengths, reevaluate executive and congressional 
oversight mechanisms and reforms to identify duplicative functions, staffing, 
resources, and the ability to link strategic intent to implementation of 
intelligence reforms. 
 
Merely implementing a U.S. domestic intelligence agency will not prevent further 
terrorist attacks. Although the domestic intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and to a lesser extent, India, have had their successes, they have also suffered 
the same shortcomings of the United States in terms of information sharing and 
oversight. Additionally, there have been numerous organizational changes and 
attempts at reform since 9/11. Only an in-depth appraisal of the DNI and NCTC’s 
performance, the ability of intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share 
information, the FBI’s progress at reforming itself, the implementation of the DHS as 
an organization with a domestic intelligence function, and the ability to provide 
effective oversight will determine whether the intelligence shortfalls identified in the 
congressional inquiry into the attacks on 9/11 have been addressed.118 
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America’s perspective on terrorism changed forever on September 11, 2001. That day’s 
tragic events brought enormous personal losses to the victims and their families and 
substantial economic losses to industries and communities directly affected. But even 
though most households were spared catastrophic personal losses, all Americans were 
affected. We all lost some of our sense of security and confidence in the future. The attacks 
on the World Trade Center and Washington, D.C. made it vividly apparent America had 
entered a new era and that our behavior and our expectations must adjust accordingly. 
Now, more than five years after al Qaeda’s action, the possibility of further terrorism has 
been factored into everyday life. The events of 9/11, the subsequent bombings in Bali, 
Madrid, and London, and the exposure of other terrorist plots have made increased 
security in public buildings, airports, and commercial centers an accepted part of twenty-
first century living.   
Americans recognize that another terrorist attack is probable and they are willing to pay 
to support efforts to limit its likelihood of success. In fiscal 2002 federal spending for 
homeland security was $21 billion. By fiscal 2006 federal homeland security spending had 
grown to $55 billion, an increase of more than 161 percent.1 About two percent of all 
federal spending now is devoted to homeland security.2   
Services like homeland security are core responsibilities of a national government. One 
strategic goal of the Department of Homeland Security is to “safeguard our people and 
their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property and the economy of our nation from acts of 
terrorism….”3 To achieve that goal policy makers must provide adequate funding for 
programs designed to reduce the probability of a successful terrorist attack as well as those 
designed to limit the damage from any attack, should one occur. But determining the 
appropriate level of spending and specifying how and where it should be spent remains a 
challenge.    
Identifying how much should be spent to protect against terrorism is an important task.  
If too little is allocated, the nation will be put unduly at risk, while if too much is spent 
consumption of goods and services valued more highly by the public will be foregone.  
Normally economists trust market forces to determine the proper level of spending for 
particular goods and services. But the market result will not be optimal for services like 
homeland security and national defense.4  
 Those activities are textbook examples of a class of goods and services economists term 
“pure public goods.” What makes these goods different from most is that individuals who 
fail to pay cannot be prevented from benefiting from the service provided.  Once we as a 
nation decide on the level of protection against terrorism we desire, everyone receives that 
level of protection. No one can be prevented from receiving the benefits of the anti-
terrorism programs undertaken. That means there is no incentive for anyone to accurately 
report how much they value the service in question. In fact, were we to take a “quasi-
market-based approach” and fund the provision of homeland security by levying a tax 
equal to each individual’s indicated willingness to pay for the service, understating one’s 
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true preference and becoming a free (or reduced fare) rider would be to each individual's 
financial benefit. This possibility for free riding causes market-based expressions of 
consumer preferences to understate the true value of homeland security programs to 
society. Consequently, too little protection will be provided unless the public sector 
intervenes.   
Since any market-based decision on the allocation of resources to anti-terrorist 
programs will clearly be sub-optimal, the amount to be budgeted for that activity must be 
determined subjectively through the political process. Through this process explicit 
estimates of measurable benefits from homeland security spending are combined with 
policy makers’ perceptions of other, impossible-to-measure, economic and personal losses 
that would accompany a terrorist attack. The budgetary process then weighs the value of 
preventing all the prospective costs to society, including non-monetary losses such as the 
loss of personal freedoms and changes in lifestyle, against other needs for funds and 
subjective perceptions of taxpayers’ willingness to pay to support homeland security. That 
subjective assessment of relative costs and benefits is the basis for the final decision on the 
amount of public sector resources to be used for homeland security.   
Budget decisions are not made in a vacuum. Studies providing estimates of the value of 
a life and estimates of reconstruction costs offer some guidance on the benefits of 
preventing a particular type of terrorist attack.5 But those analyses are incomplete and 
significantly understate the full cost of terrorism since the losses we seek to prevent extend 
well beyond the direct physical and economic damages caused by a terrorist attack.  
Indirect effects – the short-term national economic losses and longer-term reductions in 
productivity attributable to the re-direction of resources away from the actual production 
of goods and services to the provision of additional security – must also be included.   
Those indirect losses occur throughout the entire country. They are not limited to 
localities directly affected by the attack, and they almost certainly exceed the direct losses 
from the attack even after losses in lifetime income for those killed or injured are included.   
Thomas Stinson estimates that the short-term indirect loss in economic output coming 
from a terrorist attack in the United States could easily exceed $190 billion and he notes 
the ongoing productivity losses caused by the allocation of additional resources to security 
activity would greatly exceed the short-term losses in GDP.6 Those losses are nearly five 
times greater than the $40 billion of direct economic losses economists at the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank estimate for the New York metropolitan area from the 9/11 attacks.7 
Much of the longer-term, indirect economic damage from a terrorist attack will depend 
on its effect on the behavior of consumers and business managers following the attack.  
That is, how household spending and business investment are affected. Here, the relative 
psychological impacts of different forms of terrorism will be an important determinant of 
the indirect loss that ultimately occurs. The public fears some types of terrorism more than 
others and the psychological and emotional impacts of those types of attacks will be 
greater. Greater psychological and emotional damages will almost certainly lead to larger 
shocks to consumer and business confidence.  Those shocks, in turn, will lead to larger 
reductions in national economic output. Since the severity of the indirect national 
economic impacts will be strongly correlated with the psychological and emotional impacts 
of the terrorist act, programs designed to protect against the threats the public sees as most 
serious should be emphasized. Funding for programs to protect against and recover from 
those acts should reflect their higher priority.    
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  Anticipating how consumers and producers will respond to a future terrorist incident is 
difficult. But policy set by implicitly assuming that all terrorist activity produces similar 
indirect economic damage is likely to misallocate the resources available for protection 
against terrorism. Knowledge of technical parameters, such as the relative cost of providing 
a particular level of security for a particular type of target, is vital to efficient allocation of 
scarce public resources. But policy makers also need information on the public’s relative 
concern about different types of terrorist activities as they set the nation’s anti-terrorism 
budget. 
 
I.  STUDY DESIGN 
This paper reports results from a large survey of U.S. residents’ attitudes and concerns 
about terrorism in the United States. The survey, funded by the National Center for Food 
Protection and Defense,8 was conducted over the Internet by TNS-NFO9 during the first 
week of August in 2005. Responses were obtained from 4,260 U.S. residents over the age 
of sixteen. The responses were weighted by age, race and ethnic origin, sex, income, and 
geographic region to reflect the characteristics of the national population. Respondents 
were asked to assess the likelihood of six different types of attacks and about the degree of 
physical, economic, and psychological and emotional damage each type of act would inflict 
on the country and on them personally. The separate terrorist acts covered by the survey 
were another aircraft hijacking, an incident involving another form of public 
transportation, destruction of a national monument, deliberate contamination of the food 
supply, disruption of the power grid, and release of a chemical or biological agent in a 
public area. 10  
To provide a further indication of the relative concern U.S. residents attach to different 
types of terrorist attacks, respondents also were asked how they believed anti-terrorist 
spending should be allocated among potential types of targets. The exact wording of that 
question was “For every $100 that you think should be spent to protect the country from 
terrorism, how would you divide it across the following types of attack?  Enter a dollar 
amount for each.  The amounts must sum to $100.” The order of the choices given –
another attack using a passenger aircraft, an attack on other public transportation, 
destruction of a national monument, deliberate chemical or biological contamination of a 
common food product, disruption of the electrical power grid, the release of a chemical or 
biological agent in a crowded public area, and “other” – was randomized across 
respondents except that the “other transportation” category always followed the questions 
on another attack using aircraft and  “other” was always the last option.   
Asking respondents to divide $100 among protection against specific types of terrorist 
attacks rather than using a more traditional contingent valuation, willingness-to-pay 
approach, has the advantage of being readily understood and simple to respond to. It yields 
a preference ranking, indeed a percentage measure, for the allocation of finite resources.  
The form of the question was decided on following focus group studies to determine how 
readily consumers can rank and price the value of reducing the risk of various types of 
terrorism. 
The question does not specify $100 as the total amount of spending, but rather asks “of 
each $100 that should be spent to protect the country from terrorism.” Similarly, the $100 
was not specified as public or private sector spending. Clearly some of the spending to 
protect against terrorism will be done by the private sector. If we make the plausible 
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assumption that individuals unfamiliar with specific production technologies for reducing 
the probability of various types of terrorist attacks assume that the marginal reduction in 
the likelihood of a terrorist attack from an additional dollar spent is equal for each of the 
various types of attacks, the percentage allocations obtained provide a measure of the 
relative intensity or level of public concern over different types of terrorism. Under those 
assumptions the percentage allocations can also be used to provide a crude estimate of the 
amount the public believes should be spent to protect those types of targets from terrorist 




A.  The Likelihood of Another Terrorist Attack 
Nearly 98 percent of U.S. residents over age sixteen believed there will be another terrorist 
attack during their lifetime.11 Trains or subways were thought to be the most likely target, 
with 96 percent indicating they expected an attack on that portion of the nation’s 
transportation system during their lifetime (Table 1). Differences in the expectation of an 
attack were small, but statistically significant at the 95 percent level between all pairs of 
targets except for between the power grid and airplanes, food and the power grid, and food 
and national monuments. 
It is possible that public concern over terrorism, particularly incidents on trains and 
subways, was temporarily heightened by the July 2005 subway bombings in London, 
England. As a partial check on any potential response bias caused by the London incidents, 
the proportion of the population who believed there would be a terrorist attack on a target 
other than a subway or railway system was also computed. After excluding other public 
transportation targets, 96 percent of U.S. residents still expected at least one more terrorist 
act in their lifetime, and most expect more than one.  
 
  
Table 1:  Percentage of United States Residents Expecting Another Terrorist Attack During Their 
Lifetime, by Type of Attack, August, 2005. 
 
 
Indeed, 55 percent of the public expected at least one of each type of incident covered by 
the survey to occur during their lifetime. Nearly 86 percent believed a chemical or 
TYPE OF ATTACK  (Target) Percent 
Public transportation  96 
Release of a chemical or biologic agent in a crowded public area 86 
Passenger aircraft 78 
Disruption of the power grid 78 
Deliberate chemical or biological contamination of a common 
food product 
77 
Destruction of a national monument 76 
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biological agent will be released in their lifetime, and attacks on the power grid, the food 
supply, and national monuments were each expected by at least 76 percent of U.S. 
residents. Despite the high degree of public visibility given to efforts to make air travel 
secure from terrorism, 78 percent of the population over the age of sixteen believed there 
will be another aircraft hijacking incident.  
Most also believed further terrorist attacks will occur in the relatively near future. At 
least one act of terrorism within four years of August 2005 was expected by 95 percent of 
the public (Table 2). Again, while differences in the perceived probabilities of attacks 
within four years were relatively small, differences between pairs of terrorist acts were all 
statistically significant except for those between release of a chemical or biological agent in 
a public area and disruption of the power grid.  After possible attacks on trains or subways 
were excluded, nearly 81 percent of the public expected at least one terrorist incident 
during the next four years. An attack on the food system was thought least likely, but still 
44 percent of U.S. residents expected a terrorist attempt to introduce a toxin into the food 
supply chain within four years.   
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of U.S. Residents Expecting a Terrorist Attack within the Next Four Years,  
by Type of Attack, August 2005 
 
ATTACK TARGET Percent 
Public Transportation  84 
Passenger aircraft 53 
Release of a chemical or biologic agent in a 
crowded public area 
51 
Disruption of the power grid 51 
Destruction of a national monument 49 
Deliberate chemical or biological contamination of 





B.  Relative Impact of Alternative Terrorist Incidents 
Respondents were asked to rate the impact of different types of terrorist events on America 
and on them personally. Then they were asked how the nation’s anti-terrorism budget 
should be divided to protect against different types of terrorist attacks. The average 
percentages of the anti-terrorism budget assigned to protecting against each type of attack 
are shown in Table 3.  
Despite their belief that other types of terrorism were more likely in the near future, the 
public believed the implications of an attack on the food system sufficiently serious that a 
greater percentage of anti-terrorism spending should be allocated to protecting the food 
supply than to defending any other potential target among the choices offered (Table 3). 
On average, U.S. residents believed that more than 19 percent of the resources that 
should be spent to protect against terrorism should be spent to defend the food supply 
chain. Protecting against release of a chemical or biological agent in a public area was also 
seen as a high priority, receiving almost the same percentage allocation of anti-terrorism 
spending as was thought appropriate for protecting the nation’s food supply chain.  
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Table 3:  Percentage of Anti-terrorism Spending United States Residents Believe Should Be Allocated 
to Protecting against Particular Types of Terrorist Attacks, by Type of Terrorist Attack, August 2005. 
 
Attack Target Percent Percent of 
Aircraft 
Spending 
Deliberate chemical or biological 
contamination of a common food  
19.13 113.3 
Release of a chemical or biologic agent in a 
crowded public area 
18.90 112.0 
Public Transportation  17.06 101.1 
Passenger aircraft 16.88 100.0 
Disruption of the power grid 14.97 88.7 
Destruction of a national monument 8.16 48.3 
Other 4.91 29.1 
 
This survey finds the public believed that about 17 percent of the anti-terrorism budget 
should be spent to secure subways and railways and just less than 17 percent to protect 
airline transportation. Preventing disruption of the power grid was allocated 15 percent of 
the anti-terrorism budget while 8 percent would go to preventing destruction or damage to 
a national monument and 5 percent to preventing other forms of terrorism. 
The percentage allocations chosen for spending to protect against each different type of 
attack were all significantly different from zero. Differences between the public’s 
allocations for activities to protect the food supply chain or to protect against potential 
chemical and biological attacks and the percentage of the anti-terrorism budget that should 
go for protecting air transportation were statistically significant at the 95 percent level.   
When the percentage allocations of the homeland security budget indicated by the 
public were converted to spending levels as a percentage of the amount believed 
appropriate to provide secure air transportation, U.S. residents indicated they would 
allocate 13.3 percent more for protecting the food supply than for protecting airline travel.  
Preventing a chemical or biological attack was given 12 percent more, and protecting other 
transportation activities 1 percent more than preventing an aircraft hijacking. 
C.  Demographic Differences in Anti-terrorist Spending   
Although the degree of personal concern about particular forms of terrorism varied 
considerably across respondents, for the most part differences in demographic 
characteristics did not appear to be strongly related to the way individuals believed the 
anti-terrorism budget should be allocated. Responses to the question asking how anti-
terrorism spending should be allocated are summarized in Appendix A by sex, race and 
ethnic origin, age, education, income and geographic region. For ease in comparisons all 
spending allocations were normalized against the national average allocation thought 
appropriate to protect against future aircraft hijackings as identified in this survey. Results 
are reported as a percentage of the average national allocation for protecting air travel.  
Differences in the percentages of the anti-terrorism budget that particular cohorts 
believed should be allocated to protecting the airways generally were small. For most, 
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allocations were within two or three percent of the national average. There were, however, 
substantial differences for African-Americans and Hispanics. On average African-
Americans allocated 115 percent of the national average to protect air travel, and Hispanics 
allocated 110 percent. Individuals over the age of sixty-five devoted the least of any group 
to preventing terrorist hijackings, 93 percent of the U.S. average.  
There was broad and very uniform agreement that less should be spent to protect 
national monuments than to protect any of the other potential targets listed in the survey. 
With few exceptions U.S. residents – no matter their age, education, race, or income – 
believed that protecting our national treasures should receive only about one-half as much 
funding as that used to secure air travel. Individuals with annual incomes of $20,000 or 
less and Hispanics allocated the most to protecting monuments, just over 58 percent of the 
amount spent to secure air travel. Individuals age sixty-five or over would spend the least, 
less than 43 percent as much as the national average thought appropriate to protect air 
travelers. Most groups allocated an amount equal to roughly 50 percent of the resources 
devoted to protecting against another terrorist attack using aircraft. Non-Hispanic whites 
would allocate 48 percent as much; blacks, only 42 percent as much.    
The public also would allocate fewer resources to protecting the nation’s power grid 
from disruption by terrorists than to preventing air hijackings. On average U.S. residents 
believed about 89 percent of the amount spent to protect air travel should be spent to 
secure the power grid.   
Here, however, variations among cohorts were wider. Those over the age of sixty-five 
allocated nearly two percent more to protecting the electrical power system than the 
national average for protecting air travel, and those in the East North Central Region and 
the Mountain states allocated just 1 percent less than for protecting air travel. Those under 
the age of forty allocated only 79 percent as much as for air security, and blacks and 
Hispanics respectively spent 74 percent and 72 percent as much.   
On average, the public believed slightly more should be spent to protect the commuter 
and rail transportation networks from terrorist attacks than to secure civilian air traffic. 
But again, there were significant differences in the amounts particular cohorts believed 
appropriate. Some assigned a very high priority to protecting subways and railways from 
terrorism, while others believed protecting commuter rail deserves significantly less 
funding than does protecting air travel.   
Individuals in the public transportation-dependent Mid-Atlantic and New England 
states allocated nine percent and eight percent more respectively to protecting other 
transportation networks than to securing the airways. Those in the West South Central 
States would spend 93 percent as much. College graduates allocated more than six percent 
more for protecting subways and railways, while those with a high school degree or less 
would spend only 96 percent as much as they would to protect air travel. Individuals with 
household incomes greater than $60,000 would spend more to protect the commuter 
transportation network than to protect air travel, while those with incomes less than 
$60,000 would spend less. 
There also was broad agreement that protecting the food supply chain and preventing 
the release of a chemical or biological agent in a public area were the anti-terrorist 
activities deserving the most funding. The public allocated about 13.3 percent more for 
food protection and 12 percent more for protecting against release of a chemical or 
biological agent than they did to protecting against another 9/11-style attack using hijacked 
aircraft. Again, distinct differences appeared across racial and ethnic groups. Non-
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Hispanic whites allocated nearly 16 percent more to protecting the food supply and 11 
percent more to protecting against a chemical or biological attack than to securing air 
travel. While the increment over spending to protect air travel was smaller for African 
Americans and Hispanics, they still devoted more of the anti-terrorism budget to 
protecting the food system and preventing release of chemical or biological agents than to 
protecting the airways. The spending ratios for defense of the food system increase with 
age; those for protecting against a chemical or biological attack decrease with age. There 
was no distinct pattern with respect to income for either food protection or protection 
against chemical or biologic agents.  
D.   Changes in Relative Concern after Additional Information on the Potential 
Severity of Food Terrorism Incidents Is Provided 
Once respondents had made an initial distribution of funds for defending against possible 
terrorist activities, a scenario describing the progression of events following a potential 
food terrorism incident was introduced.12   
Emergency room visits and hospital admissions suddenly increase in the region 
where you live. A food-borne toxin is suspected to be the cause. The number of 
individuals affected continues to grow over the next several days and some of those 
hospitalized die. Similar patterns are seen in other metropolitan areas within the 
region. The number of fatalities associated with this problem grows. State and 
national agencies struggle to identify the source of the problem. Ten days after the 
first report a statement is issued by a government agency saying that there has been 
a deliberate attempt to contaminate the food system. By comparing the pattern of 
affected consumers and the distribution of various types of food products a single 
commonly used food product has been identified as the source. It is estimated that 
more than 50,000 units of the contaminated product have already been purchased. 
Consumers are instructed to bring all unused product to central collection sites for 
disposal.  Ultimately the death toll from this incident reaches 1,500. 
After reading the above scenario respondents were again asked to allocate resources to 
combat terrorism.  Differences between the naïve and post-scenario results are shown in 
Table 4.  
Table 4: United States Residents’ Percentage Allocation of Anti-terrorism Budget, by Target of 
Attack, Naïve and Post Scenario Allocations, August 2005. 
 






Up (down)  
Deliberate chemical or biological 
contamination of a common food  
19.13 22.88 3.75 
Release of a chemical or biologic agent 
in a crowded public area 
18.90 18.77 (0.13) 
Public transportation  17.06 16.39 (0.67) 
Passenger aircraft 16.88 15.48 (1.40) 
Disruption of the power grid 14.97 14.41 (0.56) 
Destruction of a national monument  8.16   7.84 (0.32) 
 Other  4.91   4.24 (0.67) 
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As anticipated, the proportion of anti-terrorism spending that respondents believed should 
go to protect the food supply system increased substantially. Post-scenario responses 
called for programs protecting the food system to receive nearly 23 percent of all anti-
terrorism spending, 3.75 percentage points more than before respondents were informed 
of the potential consequences of an act of food terrorism. Protecting against release of a 
chemical or biological agent in a crowded public area remained the second highest priority 
and the proportion of the anti-terrorist budget that should be devoted to that mission 
remained almost constant, falling by just over 0.1 percentage points.  
The proportion of resources believed appropriate to protect against another airline 
hijacking fell by the largest amount, down 1.4 percentage points from the average of earlier 
responses. Allocations to protecting other transportation systems, national monuments, 
the power grid, and other targets also fell, but by smaller amounts. All allocations in the 
post-scenario responses were significantly different from the airline allocation, and the 
allocations for each potential terrorist target changed significantly from the naïve 
responses except the allocation for preventing the release of a chemical or biological agent 
in a crowded public area.   
Women, African Americans, and individuals with a high school education or less 
increased the proportion of spending they believed should be devoted to protecting the 
food supply the most after being given additional information (Appendix Table A). African 
Americans and individuals residing in the East and West South Central States reduced the 
proportion of spending they believed should go to secure the airways by more than the 
national average, while men and college graduates reduced their allocation for that activity 
by less than the national average. There were relatively small differences in the changes in 
resources that were thought appropriate for the other anti-terrorist activities. 
 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
Our survey results indicate the public would devote larger percentages of the nation’s anti-
terrorism spending to preventing deliberate contamination of food items and to protecting 
against release of toxic chemical or biologic agents than to preventing other types of 
terrorist attacks. A comparison of the public’s allocation of anti-terrorism spending with 
the actual distribution of federal homeland security spending indicates current spending 
allocations do not match the public’s expressed preferences.      
We do not argue that decisions on the size and internal allocation of the nation’s 
homeland security budget should be made on the basis of a public opinion poll.  
Determining how much should be allocated to protect against particular types of terrorism 
is a complex, multi-dimensional problem and the cost of achieving a pre-set level of 
security from terrorism will depend on technical factors specific to the target and the type 
of attack. The level of security the public demands for each type of target also will depend 
on the cost of providing various levels of security. Clearly, if sufficient security can be 
provided at a low cost there is no need to spend additional amounts to protect a particular 
target, even if the public, lacking knowledge of technical factors affecting the cost of 
providing security, would allocate a higher percentage of homeland security spending to 
protecting that objective.    
We do argue that, given limited information on the public’s demand for protection 
against various types of terrorism, these survey results provide an indication of the 
intensity of the public’s preferences for protection against certain forms of terrorism.  
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Those preferences are important and need to be considered by policy makers since the 
indirect economic losses associated with a terrorist attack will almost certainly be greater if 
the attack is one that plays more heavily on the public’s fears. For example, survey 
responses indicate the indirect economic impact of deliberate contamination of a common 
food product will be greater than the impact of disruption of the power grid. Comparing 
how federal spending for homeland security is currently allocated with how the public 
would allocate it provides a crude measure of how well homeland security is being targeted 
to address the areas of greatest public concern.  
Enacted and supplemental appropriations for homeland security by all federal agencies 
totaled $55 billion in fiscal 2006 (Table 5). That total was spread across the budgets of 
thirty-three federal agencies in support of six national strategy missions. After removing 
spending by the Department of Defense, non-defense homeland security budget authority 
was $38 billion.13  Four departments – Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, 
Justice, and Energy – accounted for nearly 90 percent of the non-defense federal 
homeland security budget in fiscal 2006.   
 
Table 5: Homeland Security Funding by National Strategy Mission,  
2006 Fiscal Year Budget Authority, $ Millions. 
 
Source: Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007, 21.  
 
Thirty-four percent of total federal spending for the broader homeland security program 
goes to support the border and transportation security missions and 32 percent to 
protecting critical infrastructure and key assets. More than 62 percent of the funding for 
that mission goes through the Defense Department budget. Protecting against catastrophic 
threats, the program area that includes protecting against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats, as well as safeguarding the food system, was allocated 
$8.6 billion in fiscal 2006. 
In comparison, federal spending specifically directed to protecting civil aviation from 
terrorism was expected to total about $6.4 billion in fiscal 2006, 11 percent of all federal 
homeland security spending.14 The $6.4 billion is the total amount spent by the public and 
private sectors for civil aviation security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
specifically notes that protecting civil aviation is a matter of national security and therefore 
the responsibility of the federal government.15 The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) is specifically charged with responsibility for protecting civil aviation and TSA funds 
Mission Enacted 2006 Percent of Total 
 ($ Millions)  
Intelligence and Warning $428 0.8 
Border and Transportation Security 18,508 33.6 
Domestic Counterterrorism 4,566 8.5 
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets 
17,852 32.4 
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats 8,640 15.6 
Emergency Preparedness and Response 4,940 8.9 
Other 112    0.2 
   
    Total Budget Authority $55,046     100 
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all airport passenger and baggage screening activities as well as technology development 
and purchases.16 About 36 percent of TSA’s 2006 expected spending came from passenger 
and air carrier security fees transferred to the agency; the remainder, from general fund 
appropriations. 
The survey indicates the current distribution of resources between air carrier security 
and protection against catastrophic attacks does not reflect Americans’ relative concerns 
about those particular types of attacks. Total federal funding for programs protecting 
against all types of catastrophic attacks totaled $8.6 billion in fiscal 2006, only 34 percent 
more than was allocated to protecting the airways from terrorism. Yet this survey indicates 
U.S. residents would spend 113 percent of the amount spent to protect the airways just to 
prevent deliberate contamination of the food supply and an additional 112 percent of the 
amount spent to protect against aircraft hijackings to prevent the release of toxic chemical 
or biological agents in a public area.  
Put another way, the survey indicates that U.S. residents believe that for every $1 spent 
to protect against a terrorist attack using hijacked aircraft $1.13 should be spent to protect 
America’s food system17 and an additional $1.12 should be spent to protect against an 
attack using a chemical or biological weapon. The current ratio of federal spending for 
programs protecting against all types of catastrophic terrorist incidents to that for 
protecting aircraft falls well short of meeting that standard, even when activities protecting 
against all other types of catastrophic attacks including radiological or nuclear incidents 
are ignored.18    
It is true that it may be more expensive to provide a given level of security for air 
travelers. It is also true that the federal budget is not the only source of spending to protect 
the food supply or to protect against release of toxic chemical or biologic agents as it is for 
securing the airways. The private sector should be expected to assume some of the 
responsibility for protection against the deliberate food contamination and the release of 
toxic agents in public areas, and it does.   
Although there are no comprehensive estimates of private spending to secure the food 
chain, reports documenting spending on food safety offer an indication of the amount 
spent by the private sector and state and local government for a similar, but less complex 
task.19 Combined spending by the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, the FDA, 
and state agricultural and health departments was estimated to total $1.3 billion in 1999.20 
Private meat and poultry processors are estimated to have spent about $380 million 
annually and made $570 million in long-term investments between 1996 and 2000 to 
comply with USDA's 1996 Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(PR/HACCP) regulation.21 That same survey found the U.S. meat and poultry industry 
made an additional $360 million in food safety investments during that period for items 
not required by the PR/HACCP rule.  
But even after taking potential private sector spending into account, the ratio of funding 
to protect against catastrophic incidents to that for protecting against aircraft hijackings 
appears low. USDA’s share of the $8.6 billion budgeted government-wide in fiscal 2006 for 
the national mission of defending against catastrophic threats was $238 million.22  
Ultimately, the test for homeland security budget policy is whether the resources needed 
to provide the level of protection demanded by the public are available. As with all public 
budget decisions, balancing expected outcomes with costs is the key, even though these 
particular decisions are particularly difficult because they involve determining the level of 
spending needed to protect against low probability events with catastrophically high costs.  
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Results from this survey raise the question of whether the current ratio of spending to 
protect against further terrorist attacks using hijacked aircraft to spending to protect 
against deliberate contamination of the food supply and intentional release of a toxic agent 
in a public area are consistent with the value the public places on protection against those 
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Appendix A 
Desired Allocation of Anti-Terrorist Spending as a Percentage of 
Spending to Protect Aircraft, by Type of Event and Socio-economic 
Characteristics, Naive and Post-Scenario Results 
 
NAIVE 
Types of Attacks All Gender Race 







Food 113.3 109.3 115.2 115.5 106.3 105.9 
Chemical-Biological 112.0 111.8 112.0 111.2 112.5 113.7 
Other Transportation 101.1 102.1 100.5 100.5 105.5 103.8 
Aircraft 100.0 95.7 102.1 97.3 114.9 109.5 
Power Grid 88.7 89.4 88.3 92.9 74.5 71.6 
Monument 48.3 46.9 49.1 47.4 47.9 55.5 
Other 29.1 37.2 25.2 27.7 30.9 32.4 
POST-SCENARIO 
Types of Attacks All Gender Race 






       
Food 147.8 134.1 154.3 149.7 145.5 137.7 
Chemical-Biological 121.3 121.6 121.1 120.2 120.3 126.0 
Other Transportation 105.9 109.1 104.3 106.3 105.7 104.7 
Aircraft 100.0 98.6 100.6 98.4 109.4 107.5 
Power Grid 93.1 96.1 91.6 95.9 83.2 80.9 
Monument 50.6 50.6 50.7 49.2 51.2 58.8 
Other 27.4 35.9 23.3 26.2 30.7 30.5  
 
NAIVE 
Types of Attacks All Age Education 
 








        
Food 113.3 110.4 114.6 117.0 113.0 113.6 113.2 
Chemical-Biological 112.0 115.2 110.6 107.3 110.2 112.0 112.7 
Other Transportation 101.1 99.0 102.4 101.5 95.6 99.2 106.4 
Aircraft 100.0 105.5 97.5 93.5 103.5 102.1 95.6 
Power Grid 88.7 79.0 92.7 101.7 89.3 86.2 91.2 
Monument 48.3 52.7 46.5 42.7 51.2 49.6 45.1 
Other 29.1 30.6 28.1 28.7 29.6 29.6 28.3 
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POST-SCENARIO 
Types of Attacks All Age Education 
  








        
Food 147.8 145.0 149.2 150.0 155.7 149.2 141.7 
Chemical-Biological 121.3 123.1 120.4 119.2 116.8 121.2 123.8 
Other Transportation 105.9 103.4 107.9 103.7 98.7 104.7 111.4 
Aircraft 100.0 104.7 98.0 94.1 101.7 100.9 97.9 
Power Grid 93.1 85.7 95.6 105.6 91.5 91.5 95.8 
Monument 50.6 56.4 48.1 44.3 54.1 51.4 47.7 
Other 27.4 27.8 26.7 29.2 27.4 27.2 27.6  
 
NAIVE 












        
Food 113.3 110.2 119.3 114.0 109.2 117.1 116.5 
Chemical-Biological 112.0 109.1 111.0 115.2 109.4 113.3 112.4 
Other Transportation 101.1 92.0 90.8 95.0 109.1 104.4 105.6 
Aircraft 100.0 102.5 97.7 98.3 103.1 101.5 97.5 
Power Grid 88.7 85.5 91.4 88.7 89.1 84.5 89.5 
Monument 48.3 52.2 52.5 49.2 46.7 47.4 48.9 
Other 29.1 40.9 29.7 32.0 25.7 24.1 22.1 
POST-SCENARIO 












        
Food 147.8 141.8 156.1 150.8 141.8 149.9 150.5 
Chemical-Biological 121.3 116.8 116.7 123.5 121.3 122.7 121.6 
Other Transportation 105.9 100.0 97.9 98.1 111.1 109.6 112.4 
Aircraft 100.0 104.3 97.5 97.7 100.8 102.3 99.8 
Power Grid 93.1 92.1 96.0 91.0 96.0 89.5 92.4 
Monument 50.6 58.9 54.7 51.4 50.3 50.4 50.5 
Other 27.4 32.2 27.1 33.7 24.8 21.6 18.7  
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Food 113.3 114.4 108.9 115.5 119.4 109.9 120.8 114.2 107.6 114.9 
Chemical-Biological 
112.0 110.1 111.2 110.8 110.5 113.2 111.3 111.3 106.8 116.6 
Other Transportation 101.1 107.8 109.1 96.0 97.3 103.1 97.1 92.8 103.4 102.7 
Aircraft 100.0 103.1 98.9 95.5 101.3 101.5 104.7 101.3 95.3  
Power Grid 88.7 82.2 88.0 98.6 90.8 87.8 82.9 87.6 98.2 80.1 
Monument 48.3 48.7 48.2 46.6 45.6 47.7 47.8 50.8 50.6 49.6 

























           
Food 147.8 149.8 142.2 149.7 152.9 142.6 158.7 150.8 139.5 151.5 
Chemical-Biological 121.3 121.1 120.7 121.3 122.9 122.0 114.3 120.2 118.5 124.8 
Other Transportation 105.9 111.3 114.0 101.4 99.4 109.7 104.3 100.3 105.6 104.4 
Aircraft 100.0 102.8 101.9 95.8 100.8 101.7 101.0 96.1 97.7 102.6 
Power Grid   93.1 85.5 93.2 101.3 94.7 91.5 88.8 96.4 98.1 85.1 
Monument 50.6 51.6 50.3 50.1 46.7 50.5 50.2 51.4 54.7 51.5 
Other 27.4 24.1 23.8 26.4 28.6 28.1 28.6 30.9 32.0 26.2 
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1 This total covers the homeland security funding and activities of all federal agencies, not just the programs 
funded through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Costs of some activities of agencies within 
DHS are not included.  The budget allocation going to support Coast Guard Search and Rescue activity, for 
example, is not included in the total funding for homeland security activities.  U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 37-52. 
2Although no estimates of increases in private sector spending and in state and local government spending 
for security are available, similar growth rates would be expected. 
3U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Performance Budget Overview, Congressional Budget 
Justification (Washington, DC, 2006), 17. 
4Robert E Litan and Peter Orzag, “A Complicated Intersection: Public Action to Protect Private Property,” 
Brookings Review 20, no. 3 (2002): 20-23. 
5 See F. Kuchler and E. Golan, “Where Should the Money Go? Aligning Policies with Preferences,” Amber 
Waves 4, no. 3 (June 2006): 31-37 for an example of the use of use value of life information to provide 
information on the benefits from food safety.  
6Thomas F. Stinson, “The National Economic Impacts of a Food Terrorism Event – Initial Estimates of 
Indirect Costs,” in The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism, eds. Harry W. Richardson, Peter 
Gordon and James E. Moore II (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2006). 
7Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport, “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New 
York City,” Economic Policy Review 8, no. 2 (2002): 5-20. 
8The National Center for Food Protection and Defense was established and funded by the Department of 
Homeland Security in July 2004.  It is located at the University of Minnesota. 
9 TNS NFO (formerly NFO World Group) is a leading provider of panel-based market research in the US. It 
collects data on consumer behavior, brand performance, and campaign effectiveness by mail and telephone 
surveys of about 500,000 households. It also collects data online from more than one million other homes. 
In return for their participation, panelists received points they could add to points accumulated from other 
studies conducted by TNS-NFO to redeem for prizes. 
10The actual questions used are available from the authors on request. It was thought that concerns over a 
possible dirty bomb attack would heavily dominate all other terrorist acts so no questions about how serious 
that type of act would be were included in the survey.  There was also no attempt to elicit a response on 
spending to prevent a dirty bomb attack, although an open-ended “other” category was listed.  Only 1.5 
percent listed nuclear weapons in the other category.    
11Standard errors for these estimates are less than 0.8 percent. 
12In focus groups conducted prior to the survey there was some confusion about how serious a food terrorism 
event might be.  Some individuals thought it to be very serious with a large number of fatalities while others 
believed that food terrorism would produce nausea and other flu-like symptoms, but no fatalities.  Removing 
some of the ambiguity associated with the likely impact of a terrorist attack on the nations food system was 
expected to produce a more consistent set of spending allocation decisions. 
13U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 37-52.  
14 Specifically, estimated outlays for the aviation security program are $5.162 billion; for the federal air 
marshal program, $0.679 billion; for transportation security support, $0.488 billion, and for the Office of 
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing, $0.92 billion.  U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, Appendix, Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2007), 484-87. 
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15Section 101 specifically directs the TSA to provide for the screening of “all passengers and property, 
including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles that will be carried 
aboard a passenger aircraft.”  While there may be some costs absorbed by the airlines with respect to 
screening for private charter flights, the vast majority of the costs of providing security for civilian air traffic 
are covered within the TSA budget.  
16 They also are used to support privatized passenger and baggage screener contracts, airport managerial and 
support activities, air cargo screening operations, operational testing, and activities to improve flight deck 
and aircrew safety. 
17 This spending would be in addition to spending currently being undertaken for food safety, or the 
protection of consumers against naturally occurring contaminants, or inadvertent contamination.  Later in 
the questionnaire the difference between food safety (protecting against a naturally occurring contaminant) 
and food defense (protecting against the intentional introduction of a toxin) was noted. When respondents 
were asked how spending should be divided between food safety and food defense, they indicated a slight tilt 
toward food safety, with 53 percent of combined food safety and food defense going to food safety activity 
and 47 percent to food defense.   
18The 2007 Budget indicates a small amount ($93 million) of spending under the protecting critical 
infrastructure mission went to protect the food supply chain 
19 Food safety activity is directed toward detecting natural or accidental contamination of food products.  
Food defense is directed toward protecting against deliberate contamination of the food supply.  While there 
are some complementarities between the two activities, they are not substitutes since food defense is directed 
toward protecting against and detecting toxins that would not normally occur in food products. 
20 U.S. General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Overview of Federal and State Expenditures, GAO-01-177 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 83. 
21 M. Ollinger, D. Moore and R. Chandran, Meat and Poultry Plants’ Food Safety Investments: Survey 
Findings, Technical Bulletin No. (TB1911), (Washington, DC: USDA, 2004), 48. 
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REVIEW ESSAY 
The Edge of Disaster, by Stephen Flynn 
(New York: Random House, 2007) 
 
Paul N. Stockton 
 
Stephen Flynn has sounded a clarion call at an ideal moment. As the 2008 
presidential election nears, the nation needs a debate over the foundations of U.S. 
security strategy. Flynn frames that debate in a novel and compelling fashion. He 
also offers a vision for progress that includes an array of important, well-
supported proposals. Edge of Disaster does something more daring, however, 
that helps make it essential reading for homeland security professionals, 
policymakers, and scholars. Flynn not only proposes fundamental improvements 
in U.S. strategies and programs, but also offers a plan to overcome the immense 
political impediments to change. Some of Flynn’s recommendations will 
encounter problems still more difficult than those he identifies. At the same time,  
however, little-noticed changes on Capitol Hill are weakening other barriers to 
change. The Edge of Disaster arrives at the right time to capitalize on those 
changes, and to help transform the nation’s approach to security.  
Edge of Disaster is free of jargon and rich in ideas, both in terms of analyzing 
U.S. security problems and in recommending solutions to them. Flynn offers 
dozens of examples of innovative programs adopted by states and localities – 
programs that need such visibility if other jurisdictions are to benefit by adapting 
them to their own circumstances. In other hands, the range of topics addressed 
by this book might have resulted in a grab bag of disparate recommendations. 
Edge of Disaster (mostly) escapes that problem by revolving around a core 
theme. Flynn argues that “Our top national priority must be to ensure that our 
society and our infrastructure are resilient enough not to break under the stain of 
natural disasters or terrorist attacks.” Page #? This review will examine three 
critical components of that argument. The first is that the United States should 
abandon its current focus on fighting terrorism abroad and invest more heavily in 
strengthening the resilience of the United States against terrorist attacks and 
natural hazards alike. The second component lies in the way Flynn would have us 
build resilience – especially by rebuilding U.S. infrastructure. The third, and 
most problematic, part of Flynn’s argument lies in the realpolitik path that he 
lays out to make his proposals actionable by Congress.  
I. “The Best Defense is a Good Defense” 
The title of Flynn’s sixth chapter captures the essence of his proposal to radically 
shift the balance of effort between eradicating terrorism abroad and defending 
against it at home. Flynn notes the degree to which the Bush administration 
treats “the war on terrorism as an overseas military campaign,” and argues that 
the war in Iraq is a poster child for terrorism recruitment. He also emphasizes the 
degree to which U.S. defense spending gobbles up resources that might 
strengthen preparedness against terrorists (or their weapons) who slip into the 
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United States. That balance of effort is profoundly out of kilter, according to 
Flynn. He writes that  
The Pentagon’s budget and the war in Iraq are costing U.S. taxpayers 
more than half a trillion dollars annually. That amount represents 
approximately one half of all federal discretionary spending for 2007. It is 
illogical to invest so much in confronting the terrorist threat beyond our 
shores while being so parsimonious when it comes to protecting ourselves 
from acts of terror or catastrophic events here at home…. Conventional 
national security has been allowed to trump all other federal budget 
priorities. As the wealthiest nation in the world, we can afford both a 
second-to-none military and pragmatic investments that will make us a 
more resilient society. It is self-defeating to pursue the former at the cost 
of the latter. (p. 169) 
The balance between security investments at home and abroad is a subject that 
has yet to gain sufficient attention in the congressional budgeting process, 
especially in the annual Budget Resolution (which provides one of the few – if not 
fully binding – opportunities for Congress to explicitly trade off one government 
function against another). Flynn does a great service in bringing this issue to the 
fore. Recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimates also support Flynn’s argument 
that Iraq has become a valuable recruitment tool for al Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations.1 When the United States finally leaves Iraq, however, the upward 
pressures on the defense budget will not cease. To the contrary: war opponents 
such as Rep. Jack Murtha (D-PA) argue that given the degree to which Iraq has 
chewed up U.S. military personnel and equipment, hundreds of billions of dollars 
will be required to “reset the force.”2   
Afghanistan poses a different problem for Flynn’s recommended shift in 
budget priorities. He makes no mention of the security benefits of having evicted 
al Qaeda from its “state within a state,” including the destruction of its large-scale 
training bases. Yet, the benefits of eliminating safe havens for terrorists must be 
taken into account in evaluating the proper balance between efforts abroad and at 
home. Afghanistan also poses a more immediate problem in striking that balance. 
As the Bush administration has focused on Iraq, Taliban forces have grown 
increasingly resurgent in Afghanistan. Additional U.S. forces (and a substantial 
increase in development assistance) will be essential to reverse that trend and to 
minimize the risk that al Qaeda’s sanctuaries in Pakistan will expand once again 
into Afghanistan.3  
This is not to deny that Flynn makes a strong case on behalf of greater security 
spending within the United States. Indeed, as I will argue in the next section, his 
case for doing so is compelling. But we should not draw conclusions about the 
proper balance between efforts at home and abroad on the basis of the Bush 
administration’s failures in the latter. Those failures are so deep and pervasive 
that we may need to invest more, rather than less, to rebuild the military and 
defeat terrorism beyond our shores. Some of the necessary investment funding 
might be found within the military’s own budget. Flynn sensibly urges that we 
reexamine U.S. weapons modernization plans, and look for savings from 
programs that are no longer justified by the security environment. His interest, 
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however, is in freeing up funds to deal with a very different problem: the 
collapsing infrastructure of the United States.  
II. Infrastructure and National Resilience  
Of the many reasons The Edge of Disaster is a must-read, Flynn’s analysis of the 
brittleness of U.S. infrastructure ranks at the top. He makes a persuasive – 
indeed, frightening – case that after decades of underinvestment, U.S. critical 
infrastructure is so vulnerable that it constitutes a threat to national security.  
Some of problems that he addresses are relatively well-known (including the 
fragility of the U.S. power grid). Others, including the vulnerability and economic 
importance of U.S. inland waterway system, will serve as a wake-up call for 
readers like me. Flynn does more than reveal specific problems in U.S. 
infrastructure, though. He also offers a broader framework within which we 
should address infrastructure protection. He urges that we focus on building 
national resilience – that is, “reducing our vulnerabilities and increasing our 
capacity to swiftly bounce back from major manmade or natural disasters.” (p. 
xxi) 
The puzzle lies in how to build support for investing in resilience. Flynn notes 
that despite years of mounting evidence that U.S. infrastructure is corroding, the 
federal government and the private sector have done little to reverse that trend. 
He also argues that our unwillingness to invest in infrastructure reflects 
entrenched political beliefs. Above all, Flynn claims, “Washington’s slavish 
adherence to free-market and small-government orthodoxy” impedes efforts to 
build a more resilient nation. (p. 149) 
The Edge of Disaster suggests how the American public can be persuaded to 
support investment in resilience. First, we should emphasize that such 
investment “has the potential to help generate economic growth” and “strengthen 
the competitive position and quality of life for current and future generations of 
Americans.” Second, building the resilience of U.S. infrastructure “supports the 
national security imperative of confronting the ongoing terrorist threat.” Flynn 
argues that making our infrastructure less vulnerable to attack (and less likely to 
cause massive economic dislocation and casualties infrastructure if struck) 
reduces the attractiveness of such attacks to terrorists, and therefore reduces 
their likelihood. Investment in infrastructure benefits both security and economic 
growth. Framed in this way, embracing national resilience “can engender 
widespread public support.” (p. xxi-iv) 
The book notes that President Dwight D. Eisenhower achieved such a “twofer” 
with the interstate highway system. Eisenhower justified the vast public works 
project as essential to national security, and argued that the interstate system 
would provide enormous economic benefits (especially for rural areas). For 
Flynn, Eisenhower’s strategy provides a model of how support might be built for 
resilience funding. Ample precedent exists for wrapping a policy initiative in the 
flag of national security.4 Just such an effort is underway today with regard to 
global warming. Legislators such as Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass), chair of the 
U.S. House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 
argue that global-warming emissions threaten “our national security and military 
readiness” and that measures to reduce such emissions are therefore still more 
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essential than they would be on other grounds (such as harm to the developing 
world).5 Others – myself included – urge Congress to treat the threat of 
catastrophic natural hazards as national security challenges. It’s getting crowded 
out there, folks, as more and more policy entrepreneurs seek political and 
funding support for their initiatives by framing them as security programs. That 
competition makes Flynn’s analysis of the congressional funding process all the 
more central to his plan for the way ahead.  
III. Pork and the Politics of Choice 
Flynn proposes that Congress create an Infrastructure Resiliency Trust Fund to 
restore U.S. infrastructure. The funding required for that restoration effort will be 
enormous. Flynn notes that, according to the American Society of Civil 
Engineers, rebuilding U.S. infrastructure will cost $300 billion per year (though 
for how many years that level of effort would need to be sustained, he does not 
say). But any such funding would be at risk of being diverted by legislators to 
their home districts, in support of projects that enhance their prospects for re-
election but do little or nothing to strengthen overall U.S. resilience. Flynn 
emphasizes that “members of Congress are content to treat funding for capital 
investment as so much pork to be divvied up among their districts.” (p. 110) 
To limit the impact of pork on congressional decision-making, Flynn proposes 
borrowing from the example of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
process. Congress appointed an independent BRAC commission to identify bases 
for closure, thereby limiting the ability of individual legislators to protect bases in 
their own districts (and enabling them to escape at least some of the blame from 
voters if their bases were indeed closed). Flynn proposes that Congress establish 
an Infrastructure Resiliency Commission along the same lines, which would 
identify investment priorities “regardless of which congressional district a project 
will reside in.” (p. 110) The Commission would solicit professional input from the 
Society of Civil Engineers and other professional associations, to add stature to 
its recommendations and further ensure that funding is targeted on the most 
urgent national needs. Flynn admits, however, that Congress will be less likely to 
create such a commission because infrastructure involves so much more large-
scale pork that base closures. The Resiliency Commission “would be less 
appealing to members of Congress because it serves as a very public check on new 
government spending, thereby restricting their ability to work behind the scenes 
to negotiate pork-barrel projects to bring back to their home districts.” (p. 114) 
How can we overcome these congressional impediments to change? Here, 
Flynn resorts to deus ex machina.  He suggests that the president use “his bully 
pulpit to cajole Congress into embracing it.” (p. 114) There is no evidence that 
President Bush will do so. A future president might, especially if he – or she – 
reads Edge of Disaster. Based on the assessment of congressional behavior that 
Flynn provides us, however, even an infrastructure proposal as well-argued as his 
would seem doomed by the electoral imperatives of Capitol Hill. 
Yet, it is precisely on Capitol Hill that the most unexpected changes are 
occurring in the homeland security budgeting process. Opportunities for 
members to “earmark” the DHS budget for pork projects have grown along with 
the department’s budget, especially since 2004 when the House and Senate 
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established special appropriations subcommittees for homeland security to 
exercise sole jurisdiction over DHS spending. Subcommittee members have 
resisted those opportunities to an amazing, unprecedented degree. In fiscal year 
2005, the most recent year in which the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
has attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of congressional earmarking, 
the DHS account had by far the lowest number and dollar amount of earmarks 
of any federal department. The Department of Defense, for example, had 2,636 
earmarks totaling $9.5 billion in spending. The DHS total:  seven earmarks worth 
$27 million (out of a DHS budget of $34 billion)!6 
Something strange and important is underway here. Members of the House 
and Senate subcommittees on homeland security not only argue that DHS 
requirements are too important to hold hostage to parochial interests, but behave 
that way. Of course, other committees will also have a say over infrastructure 
investment (especially the powerful House Committee on Infrastructure and 
Transportation). The prospects for broader reform of the congressional 
earmarking system are also far from clear.7 Even in the homeland security 
budget, constituent interests do play an important role in shaping voting 
behavior on issues such as grant funding, with legislators from rural districts 
tending to support very different allocation formulae than those representing 
“high threat” constituencies such as New York City.  
Nevertheless, the homeland security committees have adopted a norm of self-
restraint on earmarking that is not only shockingly different from that found in 
other appropriations accounts, but bodes well for the investment strategies Flynn 
proposes. The Edge of Disaster may even help reinforce those norms. Flynn 
provides such a clear description of the peril the nation faces and such a 
compelling set of proposals to address those dangers that legislators (and 
presidential candidates) now have a unique roadmap to help strengthen the 
United States. Let that process of change begin.  
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